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JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND THE DUTY TO WARN:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CASE LAW

by
Casey D. Ravitz
Nova Southeastern University
Abstract
Duty to warn is an important staple of psychologists’ ethics training. It is also a
widely misunderstood and problematic law that does not necessarily capture the
intricacies of working with high-risk or potentially violent clients in outpatient settings.
While inpatient settings allow for some control over one’s clients, outpatient settings
increase the difficulty in performing risk assessments in duty to warn situations, as well
as with managing clients who are not within one’s custody. While researchers have long
identified issues related to psychologists’ understanding of the duty to warn, none have
empirically explored whether the trends seen in individual cases apply across the
spectrum duty to warn cases. This project utilized content analysis to code seventeen
state supreme court and state appellate court duty to warn cases. The project used a most
similar case design with basic inclusionary criteria of 1). State has an established duty to
warn law, 2). The case occurred after the law was created, and 3). The case named an
outpatient mental health professional. The results of this study identified several
commonly occurring themes, of which negligence and foreseeability were the most
common and had the highest impact on outcome.
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Chapter 1: Statement of the Problem
The most recent research on psychologist knowledge of the duty to warn suggests
three quarters of psychologists are unaware of or misinformed about their state’s specific
duty to warn statutes, despite Tarasoff law being a staple of psychologists’ ethics training
(Pabian, et al., 2009). Researchers point out many flaws with these statutes, citing issues
related to specificity, consistency, and clarity that may significantly affect mental health
professional’s comprehension of and ability to follow these important guidelines
(Felthous & Kachigan, 2001; Felthous, 2006; Herbert & Young, 2002). In addition, legal
researchers who focus on the duty to warn repeatedly express their bafflement at the
outcomes of these cases in higher courts, particularly when these cases expand duties
prescribed by existing statutes (Herbert & Young, 2002; Pettis & Guthiel 1993; Thomas,
2009). While many legal researchers reported the initial over burdening of psychologists
after the original Tarasoff case had lessened with a trend towards more concrete duties,
new cases suggest this trend is shifting once again (Greenberg v. Superior Court, 2017;
O’Matz, 2019; Volk v. DeMeller, 2014). Legal scholars point to issues like misapplied
medical malpractice precedent, poor understanding of the training and abilities of
psychologists, and confusion regarding how laws are applied in inpatient versus
outpatient settings. This last issue is of particular interest in this project, as while
inpatient psychologists have a duty to control their patients, outpatient therapist do not
have the ability to control their patients—something researchers have highlighted
repeatedly when discussing problematic duty to warn case law. However, no one has
used qualitative content analysis to examine the judicial decision making behind these
expanded duties. It is reasonable to question if these concerning trends are supported
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empirically. Or are a few concerning cases capturing the interest of researchers? To
psychologists, it appears as if the “facts” are being ignored, but what arguments are these
judges supporting instead? And when judges are deciding in line with the psychological
research on violence/risk, are there differences in court decisions based on how the
appellants and the respondents structure their arguments, or the facts of the case? Which
trends truly exists, and what do they potentially tell us? Qualitative content analysis
combines the strengths of interpretive legal scholar work and scientific inquiry by
providing concrete, replicable evidence to support or reject these suppositions,
significantly reducing issues related to bias.
Research Question: What issues are Higher Court Judges discussing in
outpatient duty to warn cases?
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1974/1976) first discussed
psychologists’ duty to warn, loosely defined as a psychologists’ legal responsibility to
respond to a client’s threat of violence with a warning to the victim and/or law
enforcement. The case and its effect on the field are a staple of our ethics training.
However, research has consistently shown that psychologists have a poor grasp of their
state’s duty to warn responsibilities (Leedy, 1989; Pabian, Welfel & Beebe, 2009). Most
recently, Pabian et al. (2009) found 76.4% (n = 299) of respondent psychologists sampled
across Ohio, Michigan, New York, and Texas could not correctly identify their state’s
duty to warn parameters. What makes this more concerning is only 10.5% of this sample
expressed any concern regarding their duty to warn knowledge. Moreover, these
psychologists’ knowledge was not improved by attending continuing education (CE)
seminars in ethics. Even respondent psychologists who reported having some experience
with potentially dangerous clients failed to respond accurately on vignettes assessing
knowledge on the duty to warn.
Though the specific mechanism of psychologists’ lack of duty to warn knowledge
is unknown, the literature has consistently highlighted the difficult-to-interpret nature of
duty to warn laws, which differ significantly in wording, specificity, and clarity (Felthous
& Kachigan, 2001; Felthous, 2006; Herbert & Young, 2002). Additionally, the statutes
and codes prescribing duty responsibilities are always open to legal interpretation and
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there is no standard method for sharing changing interpretations with local psychologists
(Bersoff, 2014; Herbert & Young, 2002; Knapp & Leoncelli, 2005). Court decisions
either affirm or adjust duty parameters, the latter often expanding duties beyond
psychologists’ abilities (Thomas, 2009). Reviewing decisions by judicial bodies can leave
researchers feeling as if there is a widespread fundamental misunderstanding of the
therapist-patient relationship, a therapist’s responsibility towards their patient, and a
therapist ability to influence or control a patient’s actions. Particularly, researchers
highlight how these laws are often inappropriately applied to situations where the mental
health professional has no ability to control their patients conduct (i.e., outpatient
settings). Even when presented with highly similar duty to warn cases in states with
similar duty to warn statutes, state’s higher courts produce distinct verdicts. For example,
court decisions in Idaho, Alabama, Michigan, and Ohio have protected psychologists
from liability when no explicit threat was made, while Arizona, Wisconsin, and Missouri
extended duty responsibilities to all ‘foreseeable’ acts of violence by clients (Werth,
Welfel, & Benjamin, 2009). As a result, laws may arise that psychologists struggle to
interpret, written and applied by judicial bodies for situations they appear not to
understand. In other words, judicial and psychological lenses for understanding these
issues appear to differ significantly.
However, research on judicial decision-making highlights several issues with the
way psychologists are attempting to interpret Tarasoff cases. Kritizer (2010) discusses
how courts balance issues between what is best for the consumer or the practitioner,
suggesting courts may be expanding duties that protect the consumer and related third
parties, ignoring the real world issues that arise for practitioners from their decision
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(Edwards, 2014). Robertson (2010), in his chapter on Appellate law discusses the high
likelihood that Higher Court Judges are driven by a desire to achieve policy ends rather
than merely review cases and apply the law as accurately as possible (i.e., legal realism).
Hall and Wright (2008) explain that systematic content analysis adds an empirical basis
for the kinds of interpretations legal scholars develop to explain judicial decision making,
regardless of any additional reasoning by the judges the decision fails to capture.
Applying content analysis to a set of duty to warn cases can help bridge the gap between
what is occurring in the courts and the way psychologists are interpreting their duties.
A method for applying systematic content analysis will be reviewed and applied
in terms of this project. This research will first discuss duty to warn laws in terms of their
structure, interpretability, and potential areas for confusion. This will both provide vital
information for understanding the issues with these laws as well as highlight what sort of
guidelines are necessary for mental health professionals to recognize and respond
appropriately to duty to warn situations. Further, this section will be referred back to
when discussing criteria for eligible cases. This research will go on to discuss
problematic themes currently identified by legal scholars in duty to warn cases, potential
explanations posited by researchers, and, when appropriate, how these issues affect
psychologists attempting to practice.
Duty to Warn Laws
Definitions and Terminology. Duty to warn statutes show significant variability,
making generalized discussion of these laws difficult. Researchers have highlighted that
even after four decades a clear and ubiquitous method is lacking for determining when to
apply the duty to warn (Adi & Mathbout, 2018). While some of these laws are written as
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if they apply only to specific entities such as psychiatrists or counselors, these laws
should be interpreted as applying to all mental health professionals regardless of inpatient
or outpatient settings (MHP) (Werth et al., 2009). Thus, duty to warn cases name a
variety of MHPs including social workers and case workers, who may completely lack
training in risk assessment. People often use the terms duty to warn and duty to protect
interchangeably, though they are in fact distinct methods for safe guarding third parties
from potentially violent clients. The duty to warn requires breaching confidentiality,
while the duty to protect allows for alternative actions, such as hospitalization or
intensifying treatment (Werth, et al., 2009). Some duty to protect states may still require
warning to fulfill all duties associated with the statute, thus requiring MHPs to take
multiple steps to ensure compliance with the law. In addition to the duty to warn or
protect, some states also have a duty to control, which is associated with inpatient
services. The duty to control specifically focuses on the idea of physical custody, in that
a hospital or doctor who takes charge of an inpatient has the responsibility to not
negligently supervise or release a potentially dangerous individual (Felthous & Kachigan,
2001). These three duties are distinct, but may overlap, making it difficult to determine
what responsibilities an individual MHP has in different settings. Further, this duty to
control can be inappropriately applied in outpatient settings due to misapplication of
special relationships to outpatient therapy (i.e., special relationships require the ability to
control).
Duties are either mandatory, or permissive, specifying whether a psychologist is
required or permitted to act when the duty is triggered. In other words, in each case the
psychologist has permission or the legal responsibility to act to warn law enforcement
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and/or potential victims, or act in some other way that protects the public from their
client. The duty can also be discretionary or nondiscretionary, referring to whether a
psychologist can rely upon clinical judgement regarding the authenticity of a threat or
must act once a threat is verbalized (Herbert & Young, 2002). For simplicities sake, this
proposal will use the term duty to warn (DTW) to discuss the overarching theme all these
laws fall under.
However, discerning these distinctions based on a reading of DTW laws can be
difficult. Important guidelines are often stated vaguely or left out completely. For
example, Kentucky’s statute lacks any information on what actions an MHP should take
once a duty arises, solely stating “No duty to warn/protect exists unless the patient has
communicated an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly or reasonably
identified victim or if they have communicated a specific violent act,” (Ky. Rev. Stat.
§202A.400). Duty parameters can hinge upon conjunctions (e.g., and versus or), leaving
MHPs unclear on what actions to take. For example, the statute in Ohio allows
psychologists to choose from a variety of options while the Arizona statute is unclear
regarding which or how many actions are required to successfully discharge the duty to
warn (Werth, et al., 2009). In short, many researchers conclude that confusion is
inevitable.
Duty Interpretation. In an initial attempt to code state duty to warn laws, this
author created a database breaking each state’s laws into various descriptive categories
(Ravitz, 2017). State DTW statutes and case law were drawn primarily from two
sources: The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website (2018), and
information compiled in the appendix of The Duty to Protect by Werth, Welfel, and
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Benjamin (2009). Werth et al., provided highly detailed, informative, and complete
interpretations of states duty to warn laws up until 2009. Although more current, the
NCSL web resource is often missing interpretive information informed by caselaw and
nuances found when looking up each law individually. Developing this database
identified five areas that must be addressed in order for MHPs to have enough
information to interpret their duty to warn responsibilities: Duty type; Triggering Event;
Warning; Protective Options; and Immunity. MHPs opportunity for civil liability
skyrockets without clear and specific instructions about the actions they are legally
responsible for regarding DTW, and these five categories allow for informed decision
making.
Duty Type. In regard to Duty Type, one must determine if the state has a duty to
warn or protect and whether those duties are mandatory or permissive. This could be
dictated by statute or by common law, for example, while California’s statute is written
as if it is a permissive law, case law has altered the DTW parameters to make the duty
mandatory (Werth et al., 2009). Mandatory DTW statutes often begin by stating MHP’s
are immune from failure to warn litigation except in a specified set of circumstances.
Permissive statutes generally use terms such as may/can versus must or specify that
within a set of circumstances MHPs are allowed or permitted to disclose confidential
information. However even states with permissive duties can find MHPs negligent or
otherwise responsible for failure to warn when the court determines the psychologist
should have acted differently based on hindsight. The online resource provided by NCSL
indicates whether a duty exists and if it is permissive or mandatory, assisting MHPs in
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this regard. Despite this, many psychologists appear to assume they are under a
mandatory duty to warn across states (Pabian et al., 2009).
Less clear, however, is whether one is in a discretionary or nondiscretionary state.
Nebraska has been identified as a nondiscretionary state where psychologists are
potentially liable when a client makes a threat, even if it is not judged to be a believable
threat (Herbert & Young, 2002). The Nebraska 2007 statute reads, “There is no cause of
action or duty to warn except when a patient has communicated a serious threat of
physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims,” (Neb. Rev, Stat,
§38-3132). In other words, even if an MHP assesses the situation to be low or no risk,
they are only safe from liability if they choose to warn anyway as the statute also protects
them from liability for the disclosure. Conversely, Oklahoma is an example of a
permissive discretionary state, as the statute requires the client has “the apparent intent
and ability to carry out the threat” to trigger the duty to warn and lists several scenarios
where clinicians are permitted to act (Okla. Stat. Tit.59 §1376). Another example of a
nondiscretionary state is Montana. While the state code sets clear expectations for the
triggering event, “the patient communicates an actual threat of physical violence by
specific means and against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim,” it fails
to address whether clinical judgement can be applied to determine the veracity of said
threat (Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-1102). Overall, there is still significant confusion as to
the expectations of MHPs in duty to warn situations (Adi & Mathbout, 2018).
Triggering Event. It is important for MHPs to be able to determine what
circumstances trigger the duty to warn. Tarasoff laws often fail to address assessment
practices and instead typically indicate the duty is triggered once a threat is made
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(Felthous, 2006). Although research surrounding risk assessment and management has
improved over the forty plus years since Tarasoff, this is problematic as the outpatient
clinicians who are responsible for managing DTW situations often lack exposure to that
literature or fail to pay heed to this important topic (Adi & Mathbout, 2018; Kivisto,
2016). In a 2003 study, Tolman and Mullendore found outpatient clinicians were
significantly less likely to have used any of the common risk assessment measures
typically utilized by forensic psychologists. Overall, outpatient clinicians are less likely
to have training in the static and dynamic factors that assist clinicians in making decisions
about violence risk levels (Kivisto, 2016).
The general form suggested in the Tarasoff II opinion and adopted by many states
requires a specific threat be made against an identifiable victim. One of the major issues
with identifying triggering events is when the law specifically indicates that MHPs are
liable when they “should” have recognized the DTW had arisen. For example, Virginia
state code specifies that the duty has arisen when “the provider reasonably believes or
should believe according to the standards of his profession, that the client has the intent
and ability to carry out that threat immediately or imminently” (Va. Code §54.1-2400.1).
However, clinicians and courtrooms may differ on whether they considered a threat as
serious (Felthous, 2006). A man who comes into session every day angry and talking
about wanting to punch his boss may represent a vastly different degree of risk to a
clinician than a judge or jury, as clinicians understand violent fantasies do not necessarily
translate into violent behavior (Adi & Mathbout, 2018; Gellerman & Suddath, 2005). It
also is not clear whether clinicians and courts will agree on what makes a potential victim
“reasonably” or “readily” identifiable, common terms in DTW laws.
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In terms of triggering event, twenty-seven states have DTW laws directly
addressing the circumstances. For example, Arizona’s statute outlines “the patient has
communicated to the mental health provider an explicit threat of imminent serious
physical harm or death to a clearly identified or identifiable victim or victims, and the
patient has the apparent intent and ability to carry out such a threat,” (Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 36.517.02). Even when not as clearly stated, most statutes and common law duties
address this issue in some form. Eight state laws refer to more ambiguous circumstances
triggering the duty, such as the Connecticut statute which states the “psychologist
believes in good faith that there is a risk of imminent personal injury to… other
individuals,” (Conn. Gen. State. § 52-146c). Approximately twenty-one of these laws ask
for MHPs to predict violence in some way. Though all are not as plainly stated as the
following example from Ohio, which states a MHP “may be held liable…for serious
physical harm or death resulting from failing to predict, warn of, or take precautions…”
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.51A). Overall, the variability in these three statutes
highlights some of the important nuances to these laws in terms of when an MHP should
know the duty has been triggered.
Warning & Protective Options. After the DTW is triggered, MHPs have a
variety of potential responsibilities that fall under two categories: Warning and Protective
Options. About 75% of states have relatively clear instructions on what information must
be provided, and to whom, to discharge the duty to warn. These laws generally use terms
such as reasonably or readily identifiable victim(s), meaning MHPs may be expected to
do detective work to identify potential victims. Typically, when warning is indicated
MHPs are expected to warn both potential victims and appropriate law enforcement
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officers. However, some states such as Texas only permit warning law enforcement and
do not require MHPs warn others at all (Werth et al., 2009). To once again put the
heightened risk of litigation into perspective, nearly half of Texas psychologists in the
Pabian et al., 2009 study incorrectly asserted they were legally permitted to disclose to
potential victims. In actuality, Texas has repeatedly rejected the adoption of a Tarasoff
duty and rather has a section of their Health and Safety code that states disclosures
regarding potential dangerousness can only be made to law enforcement or medical
professionals (Tex [Health and Safety] Code Ann. §611.004; Werth et al., 2009).
This Texas law is interesting when compared with the recent changes to DTW in
Florida. After the tragic shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in
Parkland, Florida, several survivors attempted to sue Henderson Behavioral Health Inc
for failure to warn or protect third parties from the shooter’s dangerousness (Smith,
2021). Florida courts held that neither inpatient nor outpatient therapists have a
responsibility to predict violence or warn third parties based on of a patient’s generalized
threats of violence (Pollack v. Cruz; Smith, 2021). Thereafter, on July 19th, 2019, Florida
legislature met and created a mandatory duty to warn law enforcement officers of specific
threats of violence, while the law is still permissive in regards to warning third parties
(Hall & Tardif, 2020). Hall and Tardif (2020) conducted a study to explore whether
expanding the DTW law this way would be effective, as there is scant literature on the
topic of police responding to warnings of threats made by mental health professionals.
While they determined that most law enforcement agencies in Florida have some sort of
policy for dealing with Tarasoff situations (90%), they also determined that about 50% of
individuals MHPs report are not detained or questioned by police, making it unclear how
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effective this policy will ultimately be (Hall & Tardif, 2020). Further, Florida higher
courts appear to remain steadfast in their view that MHPs are not responsible for failure
to warn outside of specific threats of violence (Boyton v. Burglass; Green v. Ross;
Pollack v. Cruz,).
In DTW laws, it is not always clear whether warning is also required when
Protective Options are available, or whether protective actions must be explored in
addition to warning. This is one of the more problematic areas, as determining one’s
correct course of action can hinge on interpreting a grammatical conjunction. The Ohio
statute states, “Acceptable action includes hospitalization, commitment, a treatment plan,
notifying law enforcement, and communicat[ing] to the victim or the victim’s guardian,”
but specifies elsewhere in the code that any of these four options can be taken to
discharge the DTW (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.51). It is important to note that, again,
these additional directives are not included in the section of the code provided by the
interpretive NCSL online guide but were found when looking up the statute in its
entirety. This kind of discrepancy was not uncommon and highlights another reason why
MHPs may struggle with knowing and interpreting these laws even if they make the
effort to obtain this information on their own. Delaware provides another example of
unclear wording, their code uses the term “or” when listing the warning and protective
options, but the law is interpreted as requiring both warning and initiating hospitalization
(Del Code Ann. Tit. 16 § 5402; Naidu v. Laird, 1988).
Additionally, being in a duty to protect state does not necessarily mean MHPs can
rely on clinical judgement to pick the best intervention for their potentially violent client
as DTW laws can restrict which options are legally available. Twelve states only offer
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hospitalization as an alternative or in addition to warning, whereas there are other
treatment options that perhaps should be taken prior to more drastic measures like
warning or hospitalization (e.g., medication, increasing session frequency). However, it is
unclear whether psychologists who take those evidenced based steps for assisting their
clients will be penalized for failing to predict a sudden shift in severity that leads to
violence. Only six states have multiple protective options listed, while twenty-five state
laws fail to reference any actions outside of warning. This potentially disregards many of
the steps MHPs may have been taking to manage their client’s risk potential. Examples of
duty to protect laws with potential legal quagmires are easy to identify. Tennessee lists
several options as well as any “course of action consistent with professional standards,”
but fails to identify any actual standards that may dictate actions in these cases (Borum &
Redy, 2001; Tenn. Code Ann. §33-3-207; Thomas, 2009). In Colorado, a mandatory
DTW state, a MHP is expected to make efforts to warn a potential victim as well as law
enforcement “or to take other appropriate action, including but not limited to
hospitalizing the patient,” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-117) However, later on the statute
outlines that MHPs will still be held liable for failure to involuntarily hospitalize even
outside of warning. This heightens the likelihood of inappropriate hospitalizations and
breach of confidentiality.
Immunity. Lastly, it is important MHPs know whether they have immunity for
good faith breach of confidentiality when the DTW arises. Confidentiality is at the core
of the psychologist patient relationship and breaching it can bring harsh financial and
career related consequences. The APA ethics code states, “Psychologists have a primary
obligation to take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information…” (APA
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ethics Code 4.01). The U.S Supreme Court has also maintained that confidentiality is of
the upmost importance (Jaffee v. Redmond, 1996; Trammel v. United States, 1980). In
Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, “the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust,” as clients who cannot
trust their therapist will be limited in their therapeutic process. The court recognized the
“mere possibility” of disclosure could be enough to interrupt the development of a
successful therapeutic relationship. Several court opinions reject this assumption and
dismiss the importance of confidentiality when establishing a legal duty to warn
(Schuster v. Altenberg 1988; Tarasoff II, 1976;).
At least twenty-seven states protect psychologists from liability in some form for
good faith breaches of confidentiality in DTW situations. Arizona, which has a relatively
detailed DTW statute in comparison to other states, has a well written section on labiality,
“… the mental health provider, for the purpose of reducing the risk of harm, can disclose
confidential communications and shall be immune from liability for such disclosure,”
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36.517.02). These types of clauses are vital as each warning
brings the potential for liability for inappropriate breach of confidentiality. However,
despite appearing to offer immunity from breach of confidentiality suits, some states may
still find against psychologists who choose to warn. For example, in New Jersey’s
Runyon v. Smith (2000), the court found that because the MHP waited six months to act,
the danger was no longer “imminent” and thus they were not protected under the statute
(Werth et al. 2009).
Duty to Warn Caselaw
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Illustrating the Problem. Every duty to warn and protect law, no matter how
seemingly clearly written, is open to interpretation by legal bodies. Per legal scholars on
the topic, it appears as if higher courts are likely to reinterpret duty to warn laws and
remand cases back to lower courts even without evidence of a specific threat against a
readily identifiable victim (Robertson, 2010). Even an MHP who is able to find, read,
and interpret their state’s DTW law cannot be assured a court decision will not abruptly
alter duty parameters (Herbert & Young, 2002). MHPs may not be made aware when the
statute is changed; Ohio for example changed their duty to warn statute three times in less
than a decade with no discernable method for informing psychologist of this change
(Knapp & Lemoncelli, 2005; Pabian, et al, 2009). Perhaps the best example of an abrupt
change is Tarasoff itself, which initiated a legal responsibility to breach client
confidentiality in a way MHPs had specifically not been allowed to do so previously. In
reading the Tarasoff decision, one finds that the doctors responsible for Poddar’s care, as
well as the officers who failed to hold him on those doctors’ directives, were not found at
fault for failure to initiate hospitalization as they were immune from liability under the
laws related to involuntary hospitalization. Instead, the courts established a new duty;
meaning the MHPs in Tarasoff were held liable for failing to do something they were not
legally allowed to do until after their actions could have made a difference. Tarasoff is
not a case where a client’s dangerousness went unnoticed, in fact his treatment team
breached confidentiality at least once to warn the police (Bersoff, 2014). Scholars
indicate duty to warn case law is peppered with examples where the case did not fit the
established law, and for whatever reason, the judge shifted the law to provide relief for
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the appellants (Jacobson et al., 2001). Whether this trend is supported empirically is one
of the questions this dissertation seeks to explore.
The following section focuses on cases that have been previously identified by
legal scholars as capturing some of the difficulties in duty to warn caselaw. This author
has reviewed the cases firsthand as well as read the relevant research and has often
chosen to provide a general explanation rather than another legal scholar’s specific claim
due to the general agreement across the literature on duty to warn case law as to the
issues raised below. As the initial coding method will be grounded in the theories and
trends highlighted by these cases, their inclusion in this literature review is important
regardless of whether they will ultimately be used in the proposed study. Further, it is
important to provide an understanding as to how psychologists must potentially respond
to these decisions in ways outside the scope of their regular or best practice.
Foreseeable Victims (Class). While some higher courts affirm existing DTW
laws, others appear to radically modify duty parameters, often beyond the scope of a
psychologists’ abilities to meet. One common way this occurs is by adding liability for
“foreseeable victims.” In Almonte v. NY Medical College (1994), the courts found a
trainee disclosing they had pedophilic desires to their psychiatrist supervisor triggered the
DTW. Although the trainee was expelled from the program, this was not considered
enough of an effort on the supervisor’s part. The court ultimately concluded that while
the intern had not threatened named victims, future victims were foreseeable as a class
due to the trainee’s stated desire to work with children. But what was exactly expected of
this psychiatrist? To somehow guarantee this student was blacklisted from any other
avenue of study? To monitor him from afar in a time before one left a digital footprint?

18
Following that logic, a psychologist could be held liable for any hate crime committed by
their client if that client made racist remarks in session. While other common law duties
out of Connecticut establish no duty shall arise unless there is an identifiable victim or
class of victims, that leaves a lot of ground for a psychologist to cover and not enough
direction on how to do so (Werth et al., 2009). California has also established a DTW
when a class of victims can be identified. In Barry v. Turek (1990), the majority found
that Dr. Turek, a psychiatrist, did not have a duty to warn appellant Margaret Barry, a
hospital office manager, about an inpatient’s propensity for inappropriately touching
female nurses because prior to his attack on Ms. Barry as his actions were not construed
as being seriously violent. However, the court majority did establish that any woman
working around the patient was part of a reasonably identifiable group of potential
victims, which can be interpreted as expanding the duty to include classes of victims
(Werth, et al., 2009).
Foreseeable Victims (Reasonably). Nebraska presents another example of
common law that expands MHPs duty past identified victims to those that are
foreseeable. In Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1980), an individual receiving care
through the VA purchased a shotgun from Sears and used it to shoot randomly into a
crowded nightclub after terminating treatment against his psychiatrist’s advice. The court
held that a duty to protect arose even without a specific threat being made by the client,
because the defendant doctor could ‘reasonably foresee’ the client’s mental state could
put other’s at risk (Thomas, 2009). While MHPs may be ‘experts’ in determining the
presence and treatment of mental illness, few if any mental health disorders are so
causally linked with violence that clinicians should determine the diagnosis will
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automatically lead to a client harming another (APA, 2019). Additionally, many of the
typical risk assessment tools have not been validated in outpatient settings or in nonforensic settings (Adi & Mathbout, 2018). While Anti-Social Personality Disorder
(ASPD) has been identified as a static risk factor for future violence, research has shown
only specific symptom clusters signify risk in other major mental health disorders
(Kivisto, 2016). So, while those with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major
depressive disorder do in fact show higher rates of violence, research by the NIMH and
ECA suggests the difference is approximately 16% of people with major mental illness to
7% of people without a diagnosis (Kivisto, 2016). Further, these differences are far less
noticeable when controlling for other risk factors such as substance use, divorce, or other
adverse circumstances (Kivisto, 2016). Additionally, some ‘validated’ risk assessment
tools such as the Historical, Clinical and Risk Management-20 scales fail to sufficiently
predict risk in seriously mentally ill or personality disordered individuals (Adi &
Mathbout, 2018). But under Nebraska’s DTW logic where the patient’s mental state is
considered a potential indication of danger, MHP’s should be carefully considering their
need to warn someone whenever a client with a diagnosis that’s linked with heightened
risk of violence leaves treatment. Although Nebraska enacted a statute nearly three
decades later that requires a threat be made against reasonably identifiable victim(s) to
trigger the DTW, there is no guarantee a Nebraska judge will not reextend the duty to
include foreseeable victims or case law that should no longer be applicable, which is
what occurred in Washington state in 2017 in Volk v. DeMeerleer, which is discussed in
detail in the following section about foreseeable violence.
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Foreseeable Violence. Not only do duty to warn laws at times extend to
foreseeable victims, but to situations where the resulting violence is considered
foreseeable as well. Judges point to patient characteristics that apparently make violence
foreseeable, when MHPs training does not necessarily support those assertations. As the
state that started it all, it should not be surprising that California has suffered through a
variety of frustrating expansions to their DTW laws. While establishing a permissive
statute in 1985, subsequent case law has created an expansive mandatory duty to warn.
One of the best examples of this is Ewing v. Goldstein (2004). In Ewing, it was
determined the communication of a threat by a close family member of the patient is
enough to trigger the duty to warn. Despite Dr. Goldstein initiating voluntary
hospitalization for the patient based on a call from the patient’s father, when the patient
was discharged against Dr. Goldstein’s urging Dr. Goldstein was deemed liable because
he did not warn the potential victim of the patient’s release (Thomas, 2009; Werth et al.,
2009). To highlight how unusual this case is, the inpatient doctor who discharged the
patient despite Dr. Goldstein’s urging was found not to be liable to the third parties—
despite his negligent release being central to the facts of the case (Ewing v. Goldstein,
2004). What is particularly frustrating about this finding is it does not extend to all thirdparty warnings of patient dangerousness and decisions should be based on ‘relevant
patient characteristics,’ meaning that sometimes one must breach confidentiality or take
action when a third-party calls with a warning, and sometimes one must not (Ewing v.
Goldstein, 2004). How then should a MHP determine which calls are coming from a
jilted ex significant other and which should be heeded immediately? What if the person
calling is posing as a family member, and our breach of confidentiality allows an abuser
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to track down their victim? What training does an MHP receive to prepare them for such
a decision? Conversely, MHPs do receive training around keeping confidentiality of
their clients when speaking to third parties over the phone.
Washington state presents the most recent concerning expansion of DTW
responsibilities and liability under common law via Volk v. DeMeerleer (2016). This is
the second time that Washington state has developed problematic DTW caselaw. The
original DTW law in Washington was established via Petersen v. State of Washington
(1983) and also created expansive duty responsibilities until Washington psychologists
lobbied for a remedied statute in 1987 (Volk v. DeMeerleer, 2016). VA psychiatrist Dr.
Howard Ashby saw Mr. Jan DeMeerleer on and off for nine years for bipolar disorder.
Mr. DeMeerleer withdrew from treatment three months prior to killing his ex-fiancé, one
of her sons, and himself. At the time of discharge, Dr. Ashby contends Mr. DeMeerleer
was stable and voiced no thoughts of violence towards himself or his then fiancé and her
family. This information was corroborated by family and close friends of Mr.
DeMeerleer (Volk v. DeMeerleer, 2016). Dr. Ashby was sued by surviving family
members of the ex-fiancé, claiming the doctor “might have prevented the attack by either
mitigating DeMeerleer’s dangerousness or warning,” (Volk v. DeMeerleer, 2014).
Although Dr. Ashby should have been protected by state statute as Mr. DeMeerleer had
not voiced any threats of violence, let alone a specific threat, the appellate court found the
statute only applied to inpatient services and that Petersen could still be applied. The
Washington Supreme Court determined “those with specials powers, skills and
knowledge gained through the doctor-patient relationship must protect society at large
from dangerous persons,” which potentially extends the DTW to any possible victim(s)
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(Volk v. DeMeerleer, 2014). A liability conscious Washington psychiatrist could interpret
this as meaning the DTW is triggered anytime a client with a ‘high-risk’ diagnosis is
noncompliant with their psychotropic medication. Under HIPAA MHPs cannot even
acknowledge a client is receiving services without a release. Under Volk however, an
MHP is safer inappropriately breaching confidentiality than providing treatment that
meets the standard of care.
Rulings Across Jurisdictions. Navigating the vague nuances of these laws is
made more difficult by how differently courts can rule in DTW cases across jurisdictions.
While of course there will be variability in how different states with different statutes and
case law rule on different cases, one would expect some agreement from states with
similar statutes and similar cases. This author has identified several highly similar cases
with differing results that dealt specifically with violence that occurred without any
expressed intent. Courts have applied the DTW in several cases where an inpatient client
with a violent history injured someone unaware of those tendencies. In Turner v. Jordan
(1982), Tennessee Supreme Court found that a psychiatrist, when treating a client with a
history of violence, had a duty to warn or otherwise protect a nurse working at the same
facility. This is in opposition of the triggering event laid out by state code, which requires
an actual threat be made against an identifiable victim (Tenn. Code Ann. §33-3-207;
Werth, et al., 2009). Similarly, in Powell v. Catholic Med. Ctr. (2000), New Hampshire’s
Supreme Court found that the hospital had a duty to warn a plaintiff phlebotomist of a
patient’s propensity for violent outbursts (Werth, et al., 2009). This is also in opposition
to guidelines laid out by all three of New Hampshire’s duty to warn statutes. Conversely,
the Ohio Supreme Court found a hospital had no duty to warn one patient attacked by
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another patient of the first patient’s dangerousness in Campbell v. Ohio State Univ. Med.
Ctr (2006). Further, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals barred a suit where a violent
inpatient struck a nurse, who fell and injured an elderly client in Falk v. Southern
Maryland Hospital (1998) (Werth, et al., 2009). Both court decisions cited lack of intent
as required by each state’s existing DTW laws, which appears to be what should have
also occurred in the first two cases discussed. Issues like this continue to highlight the
need for empirical analysis, as these trends may have an explanation eluding biased,
frustrated psychologists. Conversely, demonstrating a lack of discernable pattern further
strengthens the assertion these laws are too nebulous to follow correctly.
Misapplication of Special Relationships to Mental Health Professionals. In
addition to the problematic assumption that MHPs can predict violence, legal scholars
point to a potential fundamental misunderstanding about how much control a therapist
has over clients in outpatient settings. The DTW hinges on the “special relationship”
Tarasoff established between MHP and client and is central to how courts find therapists
liable for failure to warn (Thomas, 2009; Bersoff, 2014). In the American legal system,
an individual owes no liability to third parties for the acts of another except when there
exists a special relationship. As Bersoff illustrated in his 2014 article, the original special
relationship related law Tarasoff pulled from only applies in cases where, “A operates a
private sanitarium for the insane. Through the negligence of the guards employed by A,
B, a homicidal maniac, is permitted to escape. B attacks and causes harm to C. A is
subject to liability to C.” This does not apply to most of the cases where courts have
established a duty to warn (Werth et al., 2009). Or, in other words, this logic which
would be completely appropriate for establishing a duty to control does not necessarily fit
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in situations where one may have the duty to warn. Rather, some legal scholars argue
courts appear to expand the duty to warn when they perceive negligence has occurred at
some point but cannot establish liability under the current duty to warn parameters. As
Pettis and Gutheil discussed in their 1993 article on misapplication of Tarasoff to
negligent driving cases, they highlighted several cases in which they determined the
judge had stretched the legal requirements of causation in order to provide compensation.
Of particular note was Naidu v. Laird, because while Dr. Naidu appeared to have
negligently released a patient, he had the duty to control, he should not have been held
responsible for a negligent driving accident over five months after the patient was
released (Pettis & Gutheil, 1993). This raises the question as to whether judges are
focused on creating sustainable policy or providing some sort of relief to the third-party
petitioner who has been affected by violence (Edwards, 2014). It is as if in this United
States suing culture, there is always someone who can be found responsible for
something while Europe and the UK have continually rejected establishing a Tarasoff
duty (Perlin, 2006; Thomas, 2009).
A great illustration of where a court appears, to psychologists at least, to have
appropriately interpreted and applied the idea of special relationships to the duty to warn
can be found in Florida. In Boyton v. Burglass (1991) the court determined Tarasoff had
misconstrued special relationship to mean MHPs can control their patients, when what
they had found instead was the relationship between client and therapist causes the
therapist to become sufficiently involved to gain certain responsibilities regarding safety
of the patient and third parties (Tarasoff II, 1976; Thomas, 2009). Outpatient therapists
cannot control their client’s behavior, nor is the outpatient therapist’s job to control their
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client. In fact, it would be circumspect if any therapist appeared to exert enough influence
over their client that they could control that client’s actions. As the Florida court
determined, “Once suggestion of control is eliminated, there is nothing in the nature of
the relationship between a psychiatrist and his patients to support an exception to tort law
presumption,” (stone supra note 4, at 366 Boynton v. Burglass). In other words, if an
MHP cannot control their clients, then there is no exception to the general assumption
that one does not owe liability to third parties for another individual’s actions. While
there is obvious concern by MHPs at the recent change in the Florida DTW statute
discussed earlier in this paper, it appears as if Florida courts continue to establish
common law that protects MHPs from being held responsible to third parties for failure to
warn (Pollack v. Cruz; Smith, 2020). However, a different fact pattern could lead Florida
courts to rule differently in the future (e.g., specific threats).
Summary
The cases and issues discussed above represent a sample of problematic duty to
warn case law and is hardly exhaustive. Take Vermont’s Peck v. Counseling Serv. of
Addison County, Inc. (1985), where the duty to warn was expanded to include threats to
property (Werth., et al., 2009). As previously discussed, in Ewing judges found Dr.
Goldstein (the outpatient MHP) liable while dismissing the claims against the inpatient
MHP who was actually responsible for the patient’s release. Despite Dr. Goldstein’s
many attempts to protect third parties in Ewing, his failure to warn a potential victim—
who was never named to him by his patient—lead to the decision to hold him liable.
There is no shortage of frustrating DTW cases with rulings that appear to complicate
MHPs typical role in treating individuals. However, literature on this type of legal
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scholarship warn that studying higher court appeals fails to take into consideration the
cases that are never appealed, nor whose appeals are rejected, and thus are never
published (Hall & Wright, 2008; Robertson, 2010). Further, legal scholars are more likely
to focus on cases that illustrate their points, leading to potential bias. The following
section will discuss how qualitative content analysis can allow for empirical exploration
into many of the problems raised above.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Method Justification
Qualitative Methods. Legal scholars have typically eschewed the empirical
methods readily used in the social sciences (Hall & Wright, 2008; Robertson, 2010;
Vaismoradi et al., 2013). It is difficult to identify established qualitative methodologies
for use in case law. Hall and Wright (2008) reviewed 134 legal studies using some form
of content analysis to study judicial reasoning in their article proposing a systematic
method for content analysis of judicial opinions. Of these, two projects in health law met
their rigorous criteria for inclusion, which required researchers actually code the material
traditionally used in interpretive legal methods, and neither project was related to duty to
warn. Searches in Westlaw, Heinonline, and PsycInfo for empirical studies on duty to
warn caselaw did not return any results either, suggesting qualitative analysis would
represent a new way of studying the duty to warn issue.
This presents the problem of how to best address coding duty to warn case law.
Previous research suggests when legal researchers first attempt to apply qualitative
methods to their work, they work through trial and error, not recognizing they are
essentially reinventing the wheel (Hall & Wright, 2008). The following sections discuss
some of the theoretical underpinnings for the content analysis design this author chose to
apply from the field of nursing research.
Content Analysis. Content analysis is a general term that encompasses several
different strategies that can be used to analyze textual information (Vaismoradi et al.,
2013). This inferential process varies depending on the research question posed (Weber,
1984). Content analysis focuses on developing an understanding of a phenomenon based
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on informational content versus developing a theory about that phenomenon (Forman &
Damschroder, 2008; Weber, 1984). Rather than doing away with traditional legal
interpretation, it provides informational support in the form of uncovering observable,
replicable patterns (Hall & Wright, 2008). Using this method requires systematically
reading a set of documents, coding consistent features, and developing inferences about
them (Hall & Wright, 2008). This method has been used for understanding a variety of
processes, including judicial decision making (Forman & Damschroder, 2008; Hall &
Wright, 2008; Phillips & Egbert, 2017).
Systematic content analysis appears to have arisen from a desire to add scientific
support to legal scholarship (Hall & Wright, 2008). Content analysis has been increasing
in use over the last several decades within legal scholarship in coding judicial opinions
(Hall & Wright, 2008; Phillips & Egbert, 2017). Because content analysis is dealing with
revealing patterns in information, it addresses some of the issues legal scholars have
regarding whether judicial decisions can be taken at face value. While the decision may
be influenced significantly by outside forces (e.g., politics, desire to shift policy), one can
trust that the judges have at least illustrated the legal and factual arguments necessary to
support said decisions (i.e., legal positivism) (Edwards, 2014; Hall & Wright, 2008).
Content analysis is appropriate when attempting to understand a large number of
decisions that are roughly similar. Thus, while there are limitations, content analysis is
particularly useful for confirming or debunking established theory.
There are three phases of content analysis: case selection, case coding, and
analysis of the data (Carley, 2003; Hall & Wright, 2008). While literature on use of
content analysis in nursing highlights both inductive and deductive methods for content
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analysis, both methods encourage careful review of current theories and associated
literature prior to initiating case selection (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Hall & Wright, 2008).
Thus, while Hall and Wright (2008) recommend developing a code book prior to starting,
Elo and Kyngas (2008) highlight how inductive content analysis can allow for the
development of a codebook while simultaneously analyzing data. There are no systematic
rules for content analysis, other than its focus on classifying textual information into
increasingly smaller categories (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). Inductive methods recommend
careful reading of the data prior to beginning an open coding process followed by a
categorization process (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Forman & Damschroder, 2008; Neuendorf,
2017). Internal validity can be established with this method by training individuals in
coding methods and looking for interrater reliability (Hall & Wright, 2008; Neuendorf,
2017; Vaismoradi et al., 2013). If the same patterns are being observed by multiple raters,
then one can make inferences based on the available data and associated literature while
maintaining a higher level of objectivity than traditional legal scholars (Hall & Wright,
2008). Potentially, with enough cases, quantitative methods such as multiple regression
can be applied to establish patterns and potentially predict outcomes in future cases (Hall
& Wright, 2008; Neuendorf, 2017). Content analysis appears to have strong utility for use
in the study of case law and judicial decision making.
Case Selection. Several arguments are made for case selection in legal
qualitative studies. Content analysis appears to encourage working with a large set of
cases, with published studies ranging in sample size from 100 cases to over 20,000 (Hall
& Wright, 2008; Neuendorf, 2017). Recent suggestions for narrowing sample frames
highlight ways this can be done outside of random sampling while also managing the
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potential increase in bias. Systematic sampling can be appropriate, with researchers
choosing arbitrary criteria to reduce sample size, like picking every 10th case from the
available population of cases (Hall & Wright, 2008; Linos & Carlson, 2017; Webley,
2010). However, theoretically informed sampling can assist in reducing the number of
cases required for analysis. Some examples of this are using a most difficult case design
(i.e., cases where one’s theory is least likely to hold true), most similar case design (i.e.,
cases that have similar values on theoretically important characteristics), and most
different case design (i.e., cases that differ significantly on all variables but have similar
outcomes) (Linos & Carlson, 2017). These methods are best used when testing an
established theory but can be used for exploratory or descriptive studies if one does the
requisite literature review and other preparatory steps as has been done in this project
(Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Hall & Wright, 2008; Linos & Carlson, 2017).
Similar Studies. There is some difficulty in conducting a literature review of
qualitative methods used in case law analysis within health law, as very few studies have
tackled this issue. Hall and Wright (2008) only identified two, one of which was an
empirical analysis on the role of courts in shaping health policy (Jacobson et al., 2001).
Within this study, Jacobson and colleagues (2001) hoped to provide insight into judicial
explanations for resolving issues related to managed care through the analysis for 450
related cases. Authors argued systematic case content analysis was necessary to explore
the claim that courts were usurping policy change in this area--similarly to how legal
scholars comment on duty to warn case law. The authors point out the differing goals of
healthcare policy makers (i.e., allocation of finite resources) and courts (i.e., protecting
individual liberties and rights), and how attempts to reconcile these approaches presented

31
policy makers with a massive challenge. They highlight the problem between how a
doctor may not be permitted to provide a service due to restrictions placed by managed
care facilities, but that the courts appear to take the side of the individual patient who was
denied services—literally going against the established health care policy. Jacobson and
colleagues used a deductive method for coding their data, picking categories and
developing a ‘survey’ to be filled in based on each case’s content. In analyzing their data,
authors generated descriptive statistics for each of the relevant codes, qualitative
information on party characteristics, and calculated bivariate statistics to compare
directions of rulings for each of their chosen categories. The resulting data was used to
discuss the observed patterns and how they either supported or differed from existing
theory and to generate important questions for future research. The authors reported
several limitations with their methods: they only addressed a subset of the cases that are
ultimately litigated, case type categories were not mutually exclusive, there was
insufficient sample size for studying certain codes of interest, and acknowledged the
inherent subjectivity in their chosen method. Ultimately, they conclude that these
methods complement traditional legal scholarship by identifying case trends, suggesting
hypothesis for future research, and exploring relationships not easily identified by
traditional legal scholarship.
Purpose of the Study
Previous legal scholarship on the duty to warn suggests that courts are radically
modifying responsibilities beyond situations where a client has made a threat against an
identifiable victim more often than they are interpreting duties narrowly based on the
specific wording in the statute (Bersoff, 2014; Felthous & Kachigan, 2001; Felthous,
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2006; Herbert & Young, 2002; Thomas, 2009). This continues to occur despite Tarasoff
II (1976) attempting to resolve the issue only two years after the original Tarasoff (1974)
decision. This project asks the question, what arguments are higher court judges using in
duty to warn cases? Is there actually a trend of higher courts modifying duty parameters?
Are there important aspects missing from the relevant legislature when cases are
remanded (i.e., duties were unclear)? Similarly to Jacobson and colleagues (2001), this
proposed study hopes to resolve confusion between mental health professionals working
to establish tenable duty to warn policy and judicial decision making on the topic.
Qualitative Design
This author is using descriptive content analysis with a most similar case design.
Content analysis has been used increasingly in legal scholarship, although many of the
examples found specific to legal work appeared deductive (Hall & Wright, 2008;
Jacobson, et al., 2001; Linos & Carlson, 2017). This author utilized the inductive
methodology offered by Elo and Kyngas (2008) which includes a Preparation,
Organization and Reporting phase (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). As this project is being
initiated due to the potential bias in legal scholarship on the duty to warn (i.e., scholars
identifying trends on a case by case basis without empirical study), it would be
inappropriate to determine coding categories a priori. However, to have the appropriate
scientific rigor, choices regarding codes, their measurement, and coding rules should be
made prior to the final coding process (Neuendorf, 2017). To obtain this ideal in an
inductive content analysis, this requires a separation between the open coding process
and the final coding process. The inductive method of content analysis used in qualitative
nursing research appears appropriate for this exploratory analysis of the duty to warn due
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to the reliance on an open coding phase to determine codes prior to the final coding
process.

Figure 1. Inductive methodology offered by Elo and Kyngas (2008)

In the preparation stage, the theory and rationale for the project must be
determined (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Neuendorf, 2017; Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). This
project included a significant literature review on the duty to warn and content analysis,
and perusal of 70+ relevant duty to warn cases. Through this process, the research
question was developed, potential themes were elucidated through the text, and a final
sample was determined.
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There are several stages in the organization phase of content analysis. First, one
completes an open coding phase, which is the process in which documents are read and
codes are allowed to rise organically from the text (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Neuendorf,
2017; Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). Through this process, a coding scheme is developed, and
codes are identified prior to beginning the final coding process (Neuendorf, 2017). A
coding sheet is typically utilized, either externally or using specialized software (i.e.,
ATLAS.ti). Codes are then organized under higher order categories. Finally, meanings
are abstracted, and one moves into the reporting phase where the analyzation process is
explained, and results are organized and described.
Sampling
To use the most similar case design, several strict inclusion criteria were
developed. Cases were chosen from states that have duty to warn laws, as the project is
focused on how judges rule when there is an established statute, not how they navigated
the issue prior to these laws being developed. As such, cases were ultimately excluded if
they occurred prior to the duty to warn law being established in that state. Only cases by
or against outpatient mental health professionals were included in the study. This is due
to a desire to separate duty to warn or protect cases from duty to control cases, which are
often regulated by a separate statute, law, or code related to having custody over the
patient—leading to an increased level of responsibility. Cases were not excluded if the
client had been hospitalized at some point during their treatment, as long as the outpatient
therapist and/or outpatient clinic was the person named in the ensuing lawsuit.
There was a significant reduction in sample size from the time of the proposal
(155) to the final analysis (17). In the initial proposal, potential cases were identified
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through Nexus Uni using the terms “duty to warn” and “psych*” between 1974 (i.e.,
Tarasoff I) and present day. Cases were excluded if they came from states without a duty
to warn statute or code (Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, West
Virginia) as established by Werth and colleagues (2009), from individual research, and
checked against the NCSL website. This returned nearly 2,000 cases. Cases were then
excluded based on inpatient versus outpatient settings, as this study is focused on the duty
to warn versus the duty to control, by adding the term “outpatient,” resulting in 155 cases.
In the second sampling process, this author repeated the search described above
and skimmed through the 155 initial cases to identify those which could be appropriate
for inclusion in this study, resulting in 72 total cases. For the most part, cases were
excluded for being focused on inpatient services despite the search criteria. Cases were
also excluded for naming non mental health professionals in the lawsuit, for example,
several cases were focused on probation officers duty to warn. A document was
developed with short summaries of each case, with cases organized by state.
Each of the 72 cases identified were perused and a case was included in the final
sample if it: 1) Was a duty to warn case; 2) Named the outpatient mental health
professional/clinic in the suit; and 3) Occurred after the duty to warn statute was enacted
in that state. All cases were read carefully even if it was clear early on in the discussion
they would not meet full criteria. This process led to a vast majority of cases being
excluded. Overwhelmingly, cases were excluded because they occurred prior to the
statute being enacted in that state, which was something this author did not consider
during the initial and secondary sampling process. There were also still a handful of
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cases focused on inpatient mental health. However, there were several other reasons
cases did not meet criteria, including but not limited to: Suits against medical
professionals versus mental health professionals; Duty to warn of side effects of
medication rather than duty to warn of potential violence; Related to suicide not risk of
violence; Duty to control case not a duty to warn case; Focused on mandated reporter
duties (e.g., failure to report child abuse or domestic violence); The original case included
a duty to warn element but the appeal did not deal with the issue of duty to warn at all;
and Suit was focused on breach of confidentiality not failure to warn. Because this
process lead to such a significant reduction of the sample size, this author recruited
another reviewer to complete a blind review of the same 72 cases for interrater
agreement, which will be discussed further on in this section. The reviewer was tasked
with reading the same 72 cases and determining whether they met the three inclusionary
criteria stated at the beginning of this paragraph.
Ultimately, 17 cases were chosen for inclusion across 12 states (See Table 1).Of
these states, Alabama, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington all have mandatory duty to warn laws.
Conversely, at the time these cases occurred Texas and Florida were both permissive duty
to warn states (i.e., Florida’s recent law changes). Additionally, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Tennessee have an identified duty to protect
as well as a duty to warn while Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, and
Washington do not. The vast majority of states (10) explicitly state in their duty to warn
statute that a direct threat must be made to trigger the duty to warn, with only Texas and
Massachusetts differing in this regard.
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Table 1
List of Cases Selected
Case
Calderon v. Glick
Coleman v. Martinez
Dawe v. Dr. Reuven Bar
Ewing v, Goldstein
Grady v. Riley
Green v. Ross
Greenberg v. Superior Court
Kehler v. Eudaly
King v. Smith
McGrath v. Yosry
Robinson v. Mount Logan clinic
Shea v. Cartias Carney
Sherer v. Sarma
Stewart v. Fekhruddin
Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr.
Thapar v. Zezulka
Volk v. DeMeerleer

State
California
New Jersey
Michigan
California
Louisiana
Florida
California
Texas
Alabama
New Jersey
Utah
Massachusetts
Illinois
Tennessee
Illinois
Texas
Washington

Year law passed
1985
1991
1989
1985
1986
1987
1985
1979
1975
1991
1988
1989
1990
1989
1990
1979
1983

Procedure
This author used the inductive content analysis model proposed by Elo and
Kyngas (2008). In the initial proposal, this author was planning to use Quirkos, a
specialized software for qualitative analysis, but the program proved to be unsuited to this
particular project. The program controls proved to be visually confusing and unwieldly
for reviewing judicial opinions due to the formatting used in legal documents.
Specifically, the program does not seem able to tell the difference between the body of
text and footnotes making the documents appear as a jumbled mess. Ultimately,
ATLAS.ti was identified as being an appropriate tool to systematically analyze the
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sample of cases. ATLAS.ti allows for open coding, grouping into themes, categorization,
and abstraction.
After the initial literature review, a review of the 72 cases identified in the second
sampling process assisted this author’s immersion into the topic. During this reading,
simple notes were taken about emerging themes. Moving into the Organization phase, the
17 cases included in the final sample were uploaded to Atlas.TI, reread in detail, and
open coded. In open coding, this author made note of the themes the appeared repeatedly
across the sample and developed these into codes. After the open coding process, the
methods for determining when to apply different codes was operationalized in an
informal code book (e.g., capturing the necessary key words and phrases) and a final
coding scheme was developed. While all mention of different coded topics was included
in the open coding process, once operationalized, final codes were only applied when the
judges were discussing the issue rather than when, for example, the decision was
reviewing the petitioner’s motion. Further, it was determined that where the code
appeared within a document was not important, allowing for simplification of the coding
sheet. Therefore, the coding sheet asked for whether a code appears at all in the decision.
In the open coding process, it became clear that frequency with which a specific
word appeared (e.g., prediction) was not a good indication of strength, meaning, or
directionality of an argument (e.g., whether or not the court feel MHPs can predict
violence) (Carley, 2003). Rather, it was a sign to mark off “risk prediction” on the
coding sheet and to then look carefully for which way the court ultimately rules on this
issue. This precluded use of certain computer automated content analysis (CATA)
processes, such as looking at the frequency of a word and it’s synonyms (e.g.,
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predictability) to make inferences. It can be difficult to separate latent from manifest
content with CATA procedures, and this project was focused on uncovering the common
themes discussed in duty to warn cases (Carley, 2003). Thus, the coding scheme focused
on determining whether or not an issue arose within a given case, and how the court
ultimately ruled on that issue. For example, was ambiguous language discussed, and if
so, did the court agree or disagree that the language used in the statute was ambiguous?
So, for each of the above mentioned categories, cases were coded as to whether or not
these issues were mentioned, and then directionality was captured. For example, if the
case mentioned duty to third parties, it was necessary to also capture whether the judges
decided there was a duty to third parties or if there was not.
Other important information was also coded including: Diagnosis, whether the
client made a verbal threat against an identifiable victim directly to the mental health
professional named in the suit, the type of case, and the case outcome. Several codes
were considered when developing a coding scheme but were ultimately discarded after
open coding due to issues with ambiguity. For example, this author initially hoped to
code when the mental health professional had performed a formal risk assessment as
researchers have indicated that doing so, even if the results incorrectly indicate the
individual is not a major risk, should protect MHPs from losing duty to warn litigation.
However, the majority of cases do not directly address this issue, and this author did not
want to incorrectly extrapolate “risk assessment” from “intake assessment” unless stated
clearly. A code for whether the MHP attempted to take protective action was discarded
for similar reasons.
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Several other codes were developed but ultimately discarded prior to the final
coding process (i.e., not included on the final coding sheet). Codes that were discarded
included but are not limited to: Whether Tarasoff was directly referenced, whether duty
to warn/non duty to warn case law was referenced, whether the rules for summary
judgement were reviewed, whether psychological research was referenced (it never was),
if supreme court decisions were referenced (i.e., typically Jaffee v. Redmond), and
whether or not there existed a triable issue. In the end, these codes were discarded
because they did not appear to add to the understanding of the arguments being addressed
in these cases, or the concept was better captured by another code. This author attempted
to capture issues that would be of interest to either psychological or legal scholars, but
due to limitations in egal knowledge, at times it was unclear what might be considered
informative to someone with a legal background. Thus, while many of these things were
captured in open coding, they were not included in the final coding scheme/sheet.
Finally, a major area of interest that was coded was whether the decision
specifically addressed statute interpretation. Not only was the presence of interpretation
coded, but also whether courts chose to reinterpret the statute. Interestingly, as courts
most often claimed to not be reinterpreting statutes, an additional code as to whether the
judges were in fact creating new case law when they claimed not to be was added.
In the grouping and categorization process, codes focused on whether an issue
was mentioned were grouped by theme with the codes addressing which way the courts
ruled on those issues. For example, codes ‘predictability MENTIONED,’ ‘CAN predict’
and ‘CANNOT predict,’ were grouped together under ‘predictability.’ Thus, the theme of
predictability was captured within one category. Some codes were ultimately collapsed
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into each other, for example, in terms of identifiability, there were initially two different
sets of codes, one dealing with whether there was a readily identifiable victim and one
dealing with whether the court felt there needed to be a readily identifiable victim to
trigger the duty to warn. In the end, it was found that these codes were not capturing
distinct ideas and should be collapsed. In the final abstraction process, final code values
were captured within an excel spread sheet and studied for observable themes.
Analysis
Since this is an inductive, qualitative, exploratory study, the majority of the data is
reported as simple frequencies. While writing the initial proposal, this author was hopeful
that a large enough sample size would allow for bivariate or regression analyses,
unfortunately the small sample size violates the assumptions required for these kind of
quantitative analyses. Further, as Jacobson & colleagues (2001) pointed out in their work,
there is often too great of variability between cases to test certain codes quantitatively. As
there are more codes then there are cases, one can see how this is also the case for this
project. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics allow for patterns that arose in the coding
process to be compared with existing assumptions raised in the literature, for example,
whether the idea of foreseeability is more often accepted or rejected. The strength of this
study is in its ability to cautiously confirm or bely the current concerns of psychologist
and legal scholars on the duty to warn and highlight areas where future research is
necessary. Cautious interpretations can be found in the discussion section.
It should be noted that this author is aware of the inherent subjectivity of much of
the decision making in this project. While some codes were clearly objective, for
example, the type of case and its outcome, others such as those related to statute
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interpretation were particularly subjective. Overwhelmingly, qualitative researchers
recommend the use of multiple raters to establish interrater reliability (Hall & Wright,
2008; Neuendorf, 2017; Vaismoradi, et al., 2013). An individual who previously
graduated from Nova Southeastern University with a PsyD in clinical psychology with a
concentration in forensics was recruited as an interrater. While the initial proposal
indicated a psychology and a law student would be recruited to each recode 5% of cases,
due to time constraints, additional research on content analysis, and pandemic related
recruitment difficulties it appeared more appropriate to train a single individual who was
familiar with law, psychology, and the duty to warn to recode 15% of the sample. The
subsample was chosen using a random number generator. The interrater was kept blind of
the research question and the exact purpose of the study in order to reduce bias that could
compromise reliability (Neuendorf, 2017). The interrater received training in the final
coding scheme (i.e., how to determine when a code was or was not present) and coded
two cases under this authors supervision in order to assess their ability to apply the
coding scheme prior to recoding three cases (18% of total sample) for interrater
reliability.
To establish reliability, this author focused on interrater agreement and utilized a
percent agreement statistic referred to as ‘proportion agreement, observed’ (PAo)
(Neuendorf, 2017). There are two statistics for this, one when all raters rate the same
sample of cases (i.e., interrater agreement on which cases to include) and when there is a
difference in the total number of cases coded by each (i.e., testing the full sample against
the interrater’s 18%). For the first method, the equation is expressed as PAo=A/n, with A
being the total number of agreements between the two coders, and n is the total number
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of cases. For overall interrater reliability, Holsti’s method (1969) will be applied as
PAo=2A/(nA + nB), where A is the number of agreements between two coders on the
commonly coded cases, and nA and nB are the number of total cases coded by both coders.
Both equations provide a statistic that ranges from .00 (no agreement) to 1.00 (perfect
agreement). To establish interrater agreement, each of the codes included in the final
coding sheet will be compared between this rater and the independent coder using
Holsti’s method, resulting in a PAo for each theme/category.
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Chapter 4: Results
As explained within the methods, each of the main issues raised within the sample
of duty to warn cases was assigned a descriptive code that denotes the presences of the
argument, as well as directionality. To summarize the themes discussed in these cases
and the direction of these codes, this included: Ambiguous language (yes or no),
confidentiality (critical or not-critical), control (can or cannot), expert witness testimony
(credible or incredible), foreseeability (was or was not), identifiability (was or was not),
medical malpractice (was or was not), negligence (was or was not), risk prediction (can
or cannot), special relationships (was or was not), standard of care (met or did not meet),
duty to third parties (have a duty or do not have a duty), and statute interpretation (yes,
no, or claims no but creates caselaw). Additional informational codes included:
Diagnosis, threat made, statute requires threat, type of case, and outcome. In the
following section, the descriptive statistics for each of these codes will be reported.
Please see Appendix A for a simple chart highlighting the information discussed by
judges in each case.
Interrater Agreement
The proportion agreement observed was calculated comparing which cases each
rater felt should be included in the study (PAo = 70/72) (Neuendorf, 2017). The
independent reviewer suggested inclusion of only 15 cases, rejecting two that were
considered appropriate by this author, leading to 97% agreement between raters (PAo
=.97). One of the two cases the rater rejected was due to not considering a caseworker a
mental health professional (Coleman v. Martin). The other was rejected because to the
rater it appeared as if the statute was established after the case occurred (Robinson v.
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Mount Logan Clinic), however the statute is directly referenced in the case discussion
leading to this author choosing to include it despite the interrater’s rejection.
The second coder completed coding of three cases, Ewing v. Goldstein,
Greenberg v. Superior Court, and Tedrick v. Community Resource Center. These cases
were picked using a random number generator set to pick numbers between 1 and 17. In
comparing the codes of this author and the interrater across the three cases coded, this
resulted in a strong indication of interrater agreement. If the opportunity to code
correctly in each of the 17 categories is represented by 1, then there were 51 opportunities
for agreement across the three cases. The interrater and this author agreed on 47 of the
codes for these three cases, resulting in a PAo of .92, or 92%. However, when attempting
to apply Holsti’s method, this resulted in rather poor interrater agreement (PAo = .27).
This is easily explained by the vast number of potential codes (289 across the 17 cases) as
compared with the 18% of cases (3) the interrater recoded (51 across 3 cases), and
indicates one of two things. Either a different method of interrater agreement would have
been more appropriate, or the second rater needed to complete a larger number of cases.
There were only four instances of disagreement across the three recoded cases.
Assuming this would hold true if the second coder had recoded the entire sample, this
may have resulted in agreement in 266 of the 289 codes (92%). Using this number, the
percent agreement observed would be nearly 96%. Ultimately, it appears as if Holsti’s
method was ill-suited for this project and additional cases need to be coded to establish
stronger interrater agreement in the future.
Type of case and outcome
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Out of the seventeen cases identified as being appropriate for analysis, the
majority (70%) were appeals or review requests of summary judgement. Of those twelve
cases that were appeals/reviews of summary judgement, eleven (91%) were third parties
appealing summary judgements made in favor of the mental health professional or
outpatient clinic. The five remaining cases included: An MHP appealing a case that was
decided in favor of the third party (1/6%); An MHP seeking a writ of mandate from the
superior court to direct the trial court to grant him summary judgement (1/6%); A third
party appealing a dismissal in favor of the MHP (2/12%), and finally one case that
granted a review for many issues alleged by both the MHP and the third party (1/6%).
Thus, one can infer that 76% (13) of cases were in favor of the MHP at the trial court
level, while 24% (4) were appeals from MHPs of cases that found in favor with the third
party at the trial court level.
In terms of outcomes, judgements were either affirmed (53%) or reversed and
remanded to trial courts (35%) (no cause of action (1/6%), writ issued (1/6%)). After the
cases were heard by the superior courts, only 59% (10) of judgements were in favor of
the mental health professional (i.e., King v. Smith, Calderon v. Glick, Grady v. Riley,
Green v. Ross, Greenberg v. Superior Court, Kehler v. Eudaly, McGrath v. Yosry, Shea v.
Cartias Carney, Sherer v. Sarma, & Thapar v. Zezulka) and 41% (7) were in favor of the
third party (i.e., Ewing v. Goldstein, Coleman v. Martinez, Dawe v. Dr. Reuven Bar,
Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, Stewart v. Fekhruddin, Tedrick v. Community Resource
Center, & Volk v. DeMeerleer). Of the thirteen cases where the trial court either found in
favor of/granted summary judgement for the MHP, five (38%) were reversed in favor of
the third party. Of the four cases where MHPs appealed rulings in favor with the third

47
party, two (50%) cases were reversed or otherwise found in favor with the mental health
professionals.
Threat
In the majority of cases, no threat was verbalized to the mental health professional
on trial (14/82%). This explains the many summary judgement rulings, as the trial courts
across jurisdictions commonly ruled that without a direct threat, no triable issue existed.
Only two (12%) cases included direct evidence that the patient verbalized threats to the
mental health professional named in the suit, while one case (6%) did not explicitly
address the issue. Interestingly, of the two cases where direct threats were made to the
MHP named in the suit, superior courts actually found in favor of the mental health
professional. Of the 14 cases where no threat was made to the MHP directly, there were
five cases with ‘exceptional’ circumstances. Specifically, there was evidence in two
(14%) cases that the individual uttered a verbal threat to another MHP that was not
named in the suit, two (14%) cases included family members reaching out to the MHP
about concerns regarding the patient’s potential for violence, and one (7%) acknowledged
a history of homicidal ideation towards someone else ten years prior (but denied recent
ideation). Judges ruled in favor of the third party in all five of these cases.
Of the twelve states included in this study (i.e., Alabama, California, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington), ten (83%) have statutes that require an explicit threat be made against a
readily identifiable individual to trigger the duty to warn (although wording varies across
statutes). The only two that do not require an explicit threat to trigger the duty to warn
are Texas and Massachusetts. Texas has a permissive statute allowing disclosure to law
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enforcement if the MHP feels there is an imminent probability of violence (Tex. [Health
and Safety] Code Ann. §611.004). In Massachusetts, the duty to warn can be triggered
when the MHP has knowledge that the patient has a history of physical violence and the
MHP has reason to believe the patient currently presents a clear danger (Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. Ch. 123 § 36B). Overwhelmingly, however, these cases occurred in states that
require an explicit threat be made to trigger the duty to warn.
Diagnosis
Of the seventeen cases included in the final sample, four (23%) did not explicitly
discuss the diagnosis of the patient who was violent towards a third party. The majority
of the cases (35%) included individuals who had comorbid diagnoses, or who received
multiple diagnoses from different providers. These comorbid diagnoses included a
combination of everything from personality disorders, mood disorders, somatoform
disorders, neurodevelopmental disorders, trauma and stressor-related disorders, to
psychotic disorders. Several cases only reported one diagnosis, which were: Anti-Social
Personality Disorder (6%), Asperger’s Spectrum Disorder (6%), Bipolar Disorder (12%),
Major Depression Disorder (12%), and Psychosis (6%). There was no observable pattern
between diagnosis and case outcome.
Themes Within the Judge’s Written Decisions
Statute Interpretation. When coding for statute interpretation this author relied
on observations as to whether the judges directly referenced the wording and parameters
of the DTW statute within the decision. Some merely mention the statute but fail to
discuss its meaning (i.e., no interpretation), while others go into explicit detail about their
interpretation of the statute (i.e., interpretation). Additionally, of those cases that provided
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some sort of interpretation, if the judges appeared to deviate from the obvious wording of
the statute, this was considered reinterpretation. Of the cases that directly addressed
statute interpretation (12/70%) (Ewing, Calderon, Dawe, Grady, Green, McGrath,
Robinson, Shea, Sherer, Stewart, Thapar & Volk), two (16%) failed to restate the statute
in the text (i.e., Grady & Dawe). Otherwise, when statute interpretation occurred,
typically the judges restated the statute within the decision.
Regarding cases that directly discussed statute interpretation, the majority
(10/83%) expressed that they were not reinterpreting the current statute, with only
Stewart and Dawe directly admitting they were reinterpreting the statute. A second code
was developed to capture when judges who claimed they were not reinterpreting statutes
did in fact produce new case law. Of the ten cases that claimed not to be reinterpreting
the statute, it was clear that two (20%) of them resulted in new case law (Ewing, & Volk).
In three (30%) of the cases that discuss interpretation, it is unclear whether the rulings
substantially reinterpret the existing law (McGrath, Robinson, & Shea). The last five
(50%) cases interpret but do reinterpret the law, a supposition that is supported by all five
of those cases finding in favor of mental health professionals who did not warn due to a
lack of triggering event (i.e., there was no specific threat against an identifiable victim).
While McGrath and Shea resulted in rulings in favor of mental health professionals,
Stewart, Dawe, Volk, Ewing, and Robinson lead to rulings favorable to the third parties,
suggesting that statute reinterpretation does not always directly correlate with outcome.
Negligence. Negligence was the single most common theme in this sample of
duty to warn cases, with 88% (15) of cases addressing this issue (Calderon v. Glick,
Grady v. Riley, Greenberg v. Superior Court, Kehler v. Eudaly, McGrath v. Yosry, Shea
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v. Cartias Carney, Sherer v. Sarma, & Thapar v. Zezulka, Ewing v. Goldstein, Coleman
v. Martinez, Dawe v. Dr. Reuven Bar, Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, Stewart v.
Fekhruddin, Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, & Volk v. DeMeerleer).
Significantly, all seven (47%) cases where superior courts suspected negligence led to
rulings favorable to the third parties. Conversely, the other eight (53%) cases where the
superior courts did not feel the MHP acted negligently ruled in favor of the MHP.
Negligence appears to be the single greatest predictor of case outcome within this sample.
Foreseeability. Issues related to foreseeability were discussed at length in the
earlier sections of this paper. Unsurprisingly, it was a theme in the majority of cases
(70%). Of the twelve cases that discuss the issue of foreseeability (King, Ewing,
Calderon, Coleman, Dawe, Greenberg, Kehler, Shea, Sherer, Stewart, Tedrick, & Volk),
five (42%) ruled that the danger was potentially foreseeable, while six (50%) ruled the
danger was not foreseeable, and one (8%) mentioned foreseeability but ultimately failed
to address whether or not they viewed the violence as potentially foreseeable. All of the
five cases that indicated danger was potentially foreseeable resulted in outcomes in favor
of the third party (i.e., Ewing, Coleman, Dawe, Tedrick, Volk). Of the six cases were
danger was ruled as not being foreseeable, five (83%) ultimately ruled in favor of the
MHP while one (17%) ruled in favor for the third party. The idea of foreseeability was
observed to also substantially influence outcome and was often a key aspect of the
negligence finding, which will be delved into more within the discussion.
Ambiguity. Ambiguity of statute language is a much discussed topic in the
literature and within the initial sections of this paper. However this issue was only
brought up in two cases (i.e., Ewing v. Goldstein, & Green v. Ross). In Ewing, the court
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rejected the petitioners assertion that the statute in California is ‘fatally’ ambiguous and
did ultimately find in favor of the third party. Conversely, in Green, which found in
favor with the MHP, the court agreed the language was ambiguous but declined to
interpret the permissive statute as the judges felt the interpretation in Boyton v. Burglass
(1991) was clear enough and saw no reason to add to the legislation on the issue.
Special Relationships. As discussed earlier in this paper, the duty to warn hinges
on the idea of special relationships, as this is the reason MHPs are considered liable to
third parties. Typically, one is not liable to third parties outside of a special relationship.
Thus, it would be expected that this issue would be central to many of these cases. In
actuality, the issue of special relationships was only discussed in six (35%) of the
seventeen cases (i.e., King, Dawe, Kehler, Sherer, Tedrick, Volk). Half of the cases
(3/50%) decided that outpatient MHPs and patients do meet the requirements to establish
a special relationship which made the MHP responsible to third parties, and the other half
ruled conversely. There was no observable pattern between establishing or finding a
special relationship and the outcome of the case.
Standard of Care. Standard of care is an important code to measure for several
reasons, including how often this wording appears in DTW statutes. Additionally,
researchers have repeatedly highlighted the failure of statutes, courts, or legislative
bodies to identify what standard of care they are referencing. Standard of care was
address in seven (41%) cases (i.e., Coleman, Dawe, Greenberg, Kehler, McGrath,
Stewart, Volk). Of those cases, three (43%) indicated the MHP had met the standard of
care, while four (57%) indicated a failure to do so. This also appears to be a good
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predictor of outcome, as the three cases that found the MHP met the standard ultimately
ruled in favor of the MHP and converse occurred in the four other cases.
Duty to third parties. As discussed in the section regarding special
relationships, typically individuals are not responsible to third parties under the American
legal system. Ten (59%) cases discussed the idea of liability to third parties (i.e.,
Calderon, Coleman, Dawe, Greenberg, Kehler, Robinson, Sherer, Tedrick, Thapar, and
Volk), with only four (40%) ultimately deciding that MHPs should be liable to suits
brought by third parties—and all four of those resulting in rulings favorable to the third
party. Interestingly, this did not mean that the six remaining cases were decided in favor
of the MHP, as Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic was still decided in favor of the third
party. Robinson however, is an interesting case, in that the court found that while the
therapist had no duty to warn because no threat had been made, once the therapist chose
to warn (i.e., chose to answer the police officers question as to whether or not the client
had a gun), she had a responsibility to do so non-negligently (i.e., she was wrong when
she stated the client did not have a gun, and knew the client brought weapons to therapy
in the past). This may explain why the court ruled that while typically she would not be
held liable to the third party, her choice to take affirmative action required her to do so
nonnegligently.
Confidentiality. The right to confidentiality is an integral piece of the
therapeutic process, a fact that has even been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Edwards, 2014). However, duty to warn scholars have expressed concerns that the right
to privacy is being disregarded by courts in duty to warn cases. Of the seventeen cases in
the sample, only five (29%) addressed the idea of confidentiality (i.e., Ewing v.
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Goldstein, Green v. Ross, Sherer v. Sarma, Thapar v. Zezulka, Volk v. DeMeerleer), with
four of those cases (80%) indicating that inappropriate breaches of confidentiality can
have a negative impact on the therapeutic process. The single case that rejected this
assertion (Volk v. DeMeerleer) expressed the view that individual privacy cannot override
the need to protect the public at large, and rejected the assertion that this ruling could
potentially dissuade individuals from seeking therapy. Two of the five cases (40%)
ultimately ruled in favor of the third party (i.e., Volk & Ewing). There was no observable
pattern between discussions of confidentiality and case outcome.
Control. Legal scholars focused on the duty to warn have suggested judicial
bodies misapply the duty to control to outpatient mental health professionals, collapsing
the duty to control into the duty to warn. Five (29%) of cases addressed the issue of
control (i.e., Kehler v. Eudaly, Robinson v. Mount Logan, Stewart v. Fekhruddin, Tedrick
v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., and Volk v. DeMeerLeer), with three (60%) determining that
outpatient mental health professionals do not have the responsibility to control their
patients, one (20%) determining that MHPs do have the responsibility to control their
patients (Volk v. DeMeerleer), and one (20%) that failed to clearly state which way they
fell on this issue. Although there does not appear to be a pattern as to the directionality
of the ruling on control and the outcome of the case, every case that mentioned the idea
of control except for one (i.e., Kehler) ultimately ruled in favor of the third party.
Expert Witness Testimony. This writer was initially interested in what type of
arguments were used to justify judge’s decisions in duty to warn cases (i.e., case law
versus empirical research). However, there was not a single case that independently
discussed research on the topic of duty to warn, risk assessment, or risk prediction.
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Rather, these topics sometimes arose during expert witness testimony. Overwhelmingly,
judicial bodies were justifying decisions based on of previous case law or discussing how
that jurisdiction ‘typically’ responds to similar situations. Because every case utilized
case law and that case law was unique to that state, codes related to caselaw were
ultimately dropped from the final coding scheme. There were five (29%) incidences of
expert witness testimony (i.e., Dawe v. Dr. Reuven Bar, Greenberg v. Superior Court,
McGrath v. Yosry, Stewart v. Fekhruddin, Volk v. DeMeerleer), four (60%) that the court
found credible, and one (20%) that the courts found incredible (i.e., Yosry). This is a
surprising finding, as one would expect all of these cases to utilize expert witness
testimony. It is possible that there was expert witness testimony used at the trial or
appellate court level as the Higher Court judges do not always discuss these previous
cases in full detail. In every case where there was a credible expert witness for the third
party, the superior courts found in favor with the third party.
Identifiability. Under most duty to warn statutes, potential victims must be
readily or reasonably identifiable. The idea of identifiability was discussed in three
(18%) of the total sample of cases (i.e., Ewing, Kehler, and Shea). Of these three cases,
two (66%) determined the victim was not readily identifiable, and one (33%) found the
victim was readily identifiable. Concerning case outcome, the two cases where the
individual was found not to be identifiable resulted in ruling in favor of the MHP, while
the converse is true of the one case where the victim was considered readily identifiable.
Medical Malpractice. Research suggests that medical malpractice may be being
applied in duty to warn cases to find MHPs liable when cases do not fit into the
parameters laid out by duty to warn laws. There were only four (24%) cases that
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addressed the issue of medical malpractice (Calderon, Dawe, Greenberg, Volk). The
majority of these cases (3/75%) rejected attempts to apply medical malpractice standards
by third party petitioners, although there was no observable pattern for the outcomes of
these cases (i.e., mix between finding in favor of the MHP and third party). Conversely,
the only case that applied the medical malpractice standard did indeed find in favor of the
third party (i.e., Dawe).
Risk. There is a substantial amount of literature indicating that MHPs are poor
predictors of risk, even using formalized risk assessments. As indicated earlier, codes
assessing whether MHPs attempted to assess for risk had to be discarded due to
ambiguity (e.g., not being able to infer formal risk assessment from general comments
regarding assessment). Five (29%) cases addressed risk prediction (i.e., Ewing,
Calderon, Sherer, Stewart, Volk), with three (60%) indicating that MHPs cannot be held
liable for failure to predict risk and two (40%) indicating MHPs can and should be held
responsible for failing to predict violence (i.e., Volk & Stewart). Both Volk and Stewart
found in favor of the third party. There was not an observable pattern between outcome
and the issue of risk prediction, as two favored the MHP and one favored the third party
in their ruling.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This project sought to explore the research question: What issues are Higher
Court Judges discussing in outpatient duty to warn cases? As demonstrated in the results
section, some topics came up in the majority of cases and others occurred in far fewer. In
order of most to least common, the themes that arose were negligence (88%),
foreseeability (71%), statute interpretation (71%), duty to third parties (59%), standard of
care (41%), special relationships (35%), confidentiality (29%), control (29%), expert
witness testimony (29%), risk prediction (29%), medical malpractice (24%),
identifiability of the victim (18%), and ambiguous language (12%). Several of these
domains were observably related to the final outcome of the case, for example, anytime
negligence was discussed and the judges found the possibility the MHP acted
negligently—regardless of whether or not a threat was made against an identifiable
victim—they ruled in favor of the third party. The themes that appeared to significantly
influence the outcome of the case were statute interpretation, negligence, foreseeability,
duty to third parties, standard of care, and special relationships. Thus, these issues will
be elucidated in more detail within this discussion.
Statute Interpretation and Outcome
Literature on duty to warn suggests mental health professionals can be found
liable to third parties for failure to predict or warn of possible violence regardless of
whether their client ever made a specific threat against a reasonably identifiable victim
(Bersoff, 2014; Thomas, 2009). The assumption raised in previous research suggested
this was due to courts reinterpreting statutes and creating case law (Bersoff, 2014;
Felthous & Kachigan, 2001; Felthous, 2006; Herbert & Young, 2002; Thomas, 2009).
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When looking specifically at cases that interpreted or reinterpreted the local duty to warn
statute, there are some observable patterns but additional research is necessary to
establish this connection due to the small sample of cases. Many cases that interpreted
the statue refused to engage in any reinterpretation. For example, in Calderon, the judges
stated clearly that the case did not meet the necessary standards to create a duty to warn
and declined to reinterpret the statute in order to make the situation fit. In Green, the
judges declined to reinterpret the statute because they saw no reason to deviate from the
arguments raised in Boynton v. Burglass that outpatient therapists do not have the
necessary control over their patients to impose such a duty.
Conversely, there are several examples of decisions where judges deny
reinterpretation but still establish new caselaw. Ewing very clearly states they are not
reinterpreting the law while simultaneously expanding the term ‘patient communication’
to include messages from family. Much of the decision seeks to claim that family
communication is already accepted as patient communication in psychological services,
when in reality MHPs can rarely speak with family members without the patient first
signing a release. In Volk, common law under Petersen v. State (1983) was reestablished
through the Volk decision despite the statute being enacted in the late 80s in direct
response to Petersen. In fact, research suggests the DTW statute was enacted after
Petersen because of a rise in inappropriate hospitalizations related to dangerousness—
suggesting this common law ruling had a negative impact on the standard of care
typically provided by Washington MHPs (Kuszler & Price, 2018). The judges in Volk
justified this decision by explaining that the duty to warn statute only applied to inpatient
settings—neglecting to mention that the reason the code existed within the inpatient
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legislature is because at the time there was no separate legislature for inpatient versus
outpatient therapists. Research since Volk suggests that of MHPs who are aware of the
decision (89% of WA MHPs), 70% were considering changes to their practice while 50%
had already applied changes, including but not limited to: Increased screening to avoid
high risk clients, resorting to asking law enforcement for assistance in situations they
would have previously dealt with themselves, and increasing referrals for intensive
services and involuntary commitments (Kuszler & Price, 2018). Further, because Volk
did not include a threat of violence, these changes are affecting individuals who are
labile, engage in therapy irregularly, or who do not comply with their medications—
issues that should not affect whether or not these client’s receive quality therapy (Kuszler
& Price, 2018). In other words, the reinterpretation of the DWT statute through Volk
appears to already be negatively affecting the standard of care received by high-risk
clients in Washington. Research by Edwards (2014) suggests that Tarasoff created an
incentive for patients to withhold disclosure of homicidal ideation and incentive for
doctors not to probe deeply into potential homicidal ideation. One could see how Volk
would create a similar incentive.
As mentioned in the results, there were three cases where it was unclear whether
the decisions led to new case law. In Shea, the Massachusetts’ duty to warn statute
includes knowledge of a history of violence as a triggering event for the duty to warn.
However, the judges reject the MHP’s attorney’s assertion that this history of violence
needs to be connected to the victim, and interprets the statute as not requiring this caveat.
From a reading of the statute, this author feels either interpretation could be made, and
that this ruling did not substantially reinterpret the statute—even if it did provide an
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interpretation of sorts. Regardless, Shea found in favor of the mental health professional
because the MHP was not negligent, and the violence was not foreseeable because the
client repeatedly denied homicidal ideation. In McGrath, even though the courts ruled in
favor of the MHP, they asserted that MHPs can act negligently in duty to warn cases even
if there is no specific threat made against a readily identified victim. Thus, while the case
is not necessarily leading to new common law, it does leave the door open for duty to
warn litigation outside of the parameters laid out in the statute. Finally, in Robinson, the
judges stated that if a person chooses to warn, they have a responsibility to do so
nonnegligently. This may create new caselaw because it leaves room for individuals who
are warned about client’s potential for violence to sue MHPs who did not warn them
‘accurately enough.’ However, these are very subjective views and do not necessarily
correctly capture the issue from a legal stand point.
Negligence and Outcome.
Ultimately, while it appears that statue reinterpretation (whether or not the
decision acknowledges this reinterpretation) has some effect on outcome, the theme most
commonly linked to outcome is the idea of negligence. Specifically, all seven of the cases
that were decided in favor of third parties included a discussion about potential
negligence on behalf of the MHP. In Ewing, despite the valiant efforts of Dr. Goldstein
to manage his client’s dangerousness (i.e., increasing sessions, hospitalization etc.), these
efforts were used as proof of his knowledge of the client’s dangerousness and
subsequently negligence for failure to warn. This is despite CA having a duty to protect
built into their duty to warn statute, meaning that in CA one may still be held liable for
failure to warn if one chooses to protect first.
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Each case established negligence differently. In Coleman v. Martinez, the
potential for negligence surrounded the idea that the client’s therapist “should have
known” the client was experiencing psychosis three weeks prior to the violent stabbing of
plaintiff caseworker, and “should have” reported it to the client’s psychiatrist rather than
simply recommending the client keep a scheduled appointment with the psychiatrist.
Judges and the plaintiff contend if this occurred, anti-psychotic medication would have
been prescribed which could potentially have stopped the violence from occurring.
Despite observations from defendant and plaintiff that the client was experiencing signs
of psychosis, the client repeatedly denied psychotic symptoms and made no threats of
violence against others to the defendant MHP. It is not clear whether a report to the
psychiatrist would have led to immediate care, as psychiatric appointments are often
difficult to schedule on short notice. Regardless, the cause of action for negligence was
sustained, as the courts felt the plaintiff was able to establish the four elements of
negligence (i.e., duty of care, a breach of duty, proximate cause, actual damages).
Specifically, that the MHP had a duty of care related to duty to warn, breached that duty
by failing to alert the psychiatrist, which lead to worsening of psychotic symptoms, and
severe physical damages related to the client’s violent attack. The judges in Tedrick
ruled similarly, focusing on these four factors to establish the potential for negligence
after rejecting the first two appeals submitted by the plaintiffs. Ultimately, while the
judges acknowledged circumstances in Tedrick did not meet the criteria set by the DTW
statute, the case was found in favor of the third party under the ideas of transferred
negligence and voluntary undertaking.
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Similar to the voluntary undertaking theory of liability (i.e., when rendering
services to another, one is subject to liability for physical harm if it is caused by one’s
failure to use due care) used in Tedrick, the MHP in Robinson was seen as liable due to
their affirmative action. Specifically, while the MHP had no duty to warn the police
officer who came to assist her with a high risk client (because that client made no threat
towards the police officer), she was under a duty to make sure she did not provide
negligent information when she ‘chose’ to answer the police officer’s questions about
whether or not the client had a weapon.
In two cases, expert witness testimony against the MHPs—even if it was
contradicted by other expert witnesses—led to findings of potential negligence. In Dawe,
the expert witness claimed that Dr. Reuven Bar did not properly asses the client’s
appropriateness for group therapy, which led the appellate court judges to determine
negligence was an issue for a jury to decide. Ultimately they affirmed the trial court’s
decision to find in favor of the third party. In Stewart, the judges relied on expert witness
testimony that the MHP had strayed from the typical standard of care. This was despite
two expert witnesses for the MHP indicating the opposite. While the legal arguments in
Stewart also highlighted that the judges were applying previous case law, it must be
noted that the case law should not be applicable as it occurred prior to the duty to warn
statute being established. This is similar to how previous caselaw from Petersen was
applied in Volk to establish negligence.
Negligence is rarely highlighted within duty to warn research beyond the
assertion that a thorough risk assessment, even if ultimately proven wrong, should be
enough to protect MHPs from duty to warn litigation (Borum and Reddy, 2001).
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Although this author attempted to code whether MHPs assessed for risk, this was rarely
stated explicitly within the decisions, and never once was a formal risk assessment
measure documented. Conversely, in several cases MHPs were reported to complete
informal homicide assessments. In Calderon, Coleman, Robinson, Volk, and Shea, the
MHPs reported assessing for homicidal risk and the client denying homicidal ideation.
Outside of forensic or other specialized training, MHPs are typically not trained in when
they need to follow-up a denial of homicidal ideation with a formalized risk assessment
(Bersoff, 2014; Borum & Reddy, 2001; Felthous, 2006; Kivisto, 2016). Because there
were no cases that discussed formalized risk assessments, this author cannot make
inferences as to whether research suggesting a formalized risk assessment will protect
MHPs is supported by this data.
The problem with these negligence findings is that warning is not the standard of
care for treating potentially violent individual—it is a protective measure for third parties.
It is important to discuss the complete lack of empirical support that the duty to warn has
led to a decrease in violent acts by mentally ill individuals. While this research is less
relevant to judicial decision making and more to the legislative decisions, it is necessary
to highlight this research in terms of why judicial opinions finding negligence outside of
the parameters in the statute are so problematic. To date, there has been no evidence that
the duty to warn is providing any benefit to mental health providers, mental health
consumers, or the public at large other than as a source for third parties to gain some sort
of monetary recompense from therapists who happen to treat high-risk patients. In fact, a
strong empirical analysis using a multitude of incredibly specific equations and analyses
by Edwards (2014) indicated the passage of state mandatory duty to warn laws was
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associated with a 5% increase in homicides. In general, Edwards found a positive and
persistent relationship between DTW laws and homicides, but noted this association was
strongest in mandatory duty to warn states. This continues to highlight the issue of
judicial bodies ignoring relevant research when updating and changing these laws, as
recently occurred in Florida. Additionally, previous research conducted shortly after
Tarasoff established a quarter of psychologists lost an average of three patients after
providing informed consent regarding new duty to warn laws (Wise, 1978). Further,
40% of psychiatrists report being less willing to treat dangerous patients in the 10 years
after Tarasoff (Givelbar et al., 1984). Rosenhan and colleagues (1993) determined that
80% of therapists reported their patients appeared reluctant to discuss violent thoughts,
and that 60% of therapists felt this reluctance extended to sensitive information in
general. Overall, this research supports the supposition that duty to warn laws are not
leading to a decrease in homicides by mentally ill individuals, but rather negatively
effecting the standard of care typically provided by MHPs to high-risk individuals.
Foreseeability and Outcome.
Foreseeability is the issue that arose the second most in cases and was highly
connected with the outcome of the case. Every time judges indicated that the violence
may have been foreseeable, the case was decided in favor of third parties. In Ewing, as
discussed in the previous session, Dr. Goldstein’s attempts to protect were used as
evidence that violence was foreseeable. In Coleman, the judges deemed the violence was
foreseeable because the MHP ‘should have’ been aware of the client’s psychosis and
potential for violence despite the client repeatedly denying psychotic symptoms or
homicidal ideation—similar to how the negligence issue was decided. In Dawe,
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foreseeability rested on the idea that violence would be foreseeable if someone who was
not a good fit for group therapy was inserted into a group—which is a bit of a stretch as
there is no standard for establishing a client is appropriate for group therapy. In Tedrick,
the MHPs were aware of the client’s homicidal and suicidal ideation and were actively
attempting to engage him in more intensive treatment, leading the court to determine
violence was foreseeable. Finally, in Volk foreseeability was established under the
Petersen standard discussed elsewhere in this paper.
As discussed extensively in this paper, foreseeability is a common issue in the
duty to warn literature. Previous research indicates that courts will use the issue of
potential foreseeability to expand the duty to warn to situations not necessarily captured
within the statute, as was also observed within this sample (Thomas, 2009; Werth, et al.,
2009). Tarasoff II was meant to narrow the duty to warn to situations where a client
makes a specific threat against a reasonably identifiable victim. Research suggests many
state statutes were enacted in similar attempts to narrow the scope of the DTW (Kuszler
& Price, 2018). In terms of why MHPs should not be held to standard of potential
foreseeability, there remains significant debate as to whether MHPs are able to predict
violence even using established risk assessment methods (Edwards, 2014). Many of these
risk assessment methods have yet to be validated in outpatient or non-forensic settings
(Adi & Mathbout, 2018). When the issue of predicting violence arose in this sample
(5/29%), judges mostly acknowledged that therapists cannot be expected to predict risk
outside of specific threats of violence to an identifiable victim (i.e., Ewing, Calderon,
Sherer). Conversely, the Volk decision explicitly rejected the idea that MHPs cannot
predict violence, basically stating that MHPs are often involved in risk assessment and
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thus must have some ability to predict risk. In Stewart, the decision highlights that
prediction is included within the state statute, however, the exact wording still requires a
specific threat which should have protected the MHP, “Mental health professionals may
predict, warn or take precautions if and only if an actual threat of bodily harm against a
clearly identified victim is communicated,” (Tenn. Code Ann. §33-3-206). Even if risk
prediction was not discussed in cases where the issue of foreseeability arose, several of
the cases that established that violence or victims were foreseeable clearly expected
MHPs to predict violence (e.g., Coleman).
There were certainly cases within this sample that held to the standards
established in the state’s duty to warn statutes. For example, Greenberg v. Superior
Court held that violence was not foreseeable because no threats of violence were made
against the victims. In Kehler v. Eudaly, the judges determined that there is no duty in
Texas without there being an identifiable victim and thus violence was not foreseeable.
In Shea v. Cartias Carney, the client repeatedly denied violent ideation to the defendant
leading to the ruling that violence was not foreseeable. In Sherer v. Sarma, there was no
evidence the client ever made any comments about violent ideation to the MHPs named
in the suit. In this sample, judges were about 50% as likely to determine something was
foreseeable as they were to determine the opposite (i.e., mentioned in 12 cases, 6 not
foreseeable, 5 foreseeable, 1 undetermined). Even in cases with incredibly similar fact
patterns, jurisdiction appears to play a major role in the decisions regarding
foreseeability. Research suggests that there may be hidden political agendas behind these
choices, but these difference may also simply be due to how states view different issues
such as negligence (e.g., strict liability versus negligence), or relevant case law within
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that state (Robertson, 2010; Schuster v. Altenberg, 1988). It is important that future
research on this topic compare rulings within specific jurisdictions rather than across
many jurisdictions as this project did, as this will help confirm whether these trends are
state specific or based on the facts of the case.
Duty to Third Parties and Outcome.
Whether or not MHPs have a duty to third parties was an often discussed issue
within this sample (10/59%). Cases varied as to why a duty was or was not established,
with four cases establishing a duty to third parties and six the converse. In Coleman, case
law related to foreseeability standards established a precedent for a duty to third parties.
In Dawe and Volk, simply the existence of a (misapplied) special relationship between
MHP and client created liability to third parties. Regarding Tedrick, liability to third
parties was established through transferred negligence and voluntary undertaking
law/case law. Unsurprisingly, in all of the cases where a duty to third parties was
established, the judges ruled in favor of the third parties.
Several issues were discussed in the cases that did not establish a duty to third
parties. In Calderon, judges found that there was no duty because facts of the case did
not meet the standards of the duty to warn statute. Greenberg actually used Calderon as
caselaw for not establishing a duty to third parties outside of situations that meet the
standards of California’s duty to warn statute. Similarly, Sherer judges determined there
was no duty to third parties because there was no threat made to create a duty. Regarding
Kehler, judges stated clearly that there was no duty to third parties for failure to breach
confidentiality under Texas state law. Even the judges in Robinson established that
typically there is not duty to third parties outside of situations that fit the DTW standard
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in Utah, but relied on the affirmative action of the MHP to create a duty to third parties
outside of a DTW situation. Finally, in Thapar, judges sated there is no duty to third
parties not to negligently misdiagnosis or mistreat patients, as the petitioner was alleging
occurred.
The issue of duty to third parties is not typically explicitly discussed in duty to
warn literature. It’s understood that the existence of the duty to warn creates a major
exception to the typical responsibility of individuals toward third parties. However, as
this issue was raised so often within this small sample of cases, it is important that future
research continue to explore how courts are determining duty to third parties outside of
situations that fit state DTW parameters.
Standard of Care and Outcome.
The issue of whether or not the MHP met the standard of care was also discussed
in a significant number of cases (7/41%). This issue was directly connected with
outcome, with the four cases that established the MHP did not meet the standard of care
finding in favor of the third party, while the converse is true of the three cases that
determined the MHP did meet the standard of care. In Coleman, this was due to the
MHPs failure to report potential psychotic symptoms to the client’s psychiatrist—again,
despite the client denying the presence of psychotic symptoms and homicidal ideation to
the MHP. In Dawe, Volk, and Stewart, the judges relied on expert witness testimony to
establish a failure to meet the standard of care. In Greenberg, despite conflicting expert
witness testimony, the judges appeared to rely on testimony in favor of the MHP to
determine the MHP met the standard of care. In McGrath, the judges ruled expert
testimony from the third party’s expert was incredible and thus found the MHP did meet
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the standard of care. Interestingly, Kehler highlighted that choosing to breach
confidentiality would have actually gone against the established standard of care due to
the way the Texas confidentiality statute is written.
Problems related to determining a standard of care are commonly discussed in
duty to warn literature. Specifically, legal and psychological scholars continue to point
out that the standard of care referred to in these cases is either uncertain or nonexistent
(Thomas, 2009). While there are formal risk assessment procedures that evaluate the
probability of future violent behavior, these methods are not taught outside of the forensic
specialty nor are they particularly reliable (Bersoff, 2014; Borum & Redy, 2001). Further,
they would not be helpful in a stereotypical DTW situation, as one does not typically have
access to collateral contacts nor the other necessary information for determining risk that
is necessary for a full, formal risk assessment (Borum & Redy, 2001). Additionally, these
measures do not necessarily help an MHP determine how likely a client is to carry out a
violent threat (Bersoff, 2014). Regardless, even if psychologists can sometimes make
informed decisions about someone’s risk level, MHPs cannot predict future violence.
However, when states add language by statute or common law referencing a ‘reasonable
degree of skill’ or ‘professional standards,’ it increases the likelihood a judicial body will
use the benefit of hindsight to find against an MHP for failure to warn (Thomas, 2009).
In fact, in line with the ruling in Kehler, the most universal standard of care in the
mental health field is the assurance of confidentiality (Edwards, 2014). One argument
suggests the court erred in Tarasoff when they assumed meeting the burden of risk
assessment the case established would only require professionals’ exercise a reasonable
degree of skill generally held by most MHPs in comparable circumstances (Bersoff,
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2014). The truth is, while there are recommendations in the literature, very little clinical
training (outside of specialized forensic programs) addresses non-suicide specific risk
assessment. Further, current practices in risk assessment refer formal risk evaluations
versus DTW situations, meaning again that there is no standard (Borum & Redy, 2001;
Thomas, 2009).
Judge Mosk captured this idea well in his dissent in Hedlund v. Superior Courts
(1983), another California DTW case that expanded duties in that state. Mosk stated,
“The majority opinion unfortunately perpetuates the myth that psychiatrists and
psychologists inherently possess powers of clairvoyance to predict violence… as if that
subjective characteristic [i.e. violence] would be revealed through a stethoscope or by an
X-ray.” Courts continue to liken mental illness, or dangerousness, to much more clear-cut
factors such as medical diagnoses or contagious diseases (Schuster v. Altenberg, 1988;
Tarasoff II, 1976;. In reality, the treatment and signs of potential violence or
dangerousness are not necessarily obvious. Static factors that have been identified as
increasing risk of violence in forensic populations have less influence in DTW situations,
whereas dynamic factors such as substance use contribute more to risk level in outpatient
populations (Kivisto, 2016). Further, violent fantasies are common in normal populations
(Gellerman & Suddath, 2005). Research has additionally shown that only a small
percentage of individuals follow through with threats of homicidal violence (Kivisto,
2016). Although these individuals do have a higher rate of overall violence, it appears
nearly half of the eventual victims differed from those originally identified in therapy
(Kivisto, 2016). As such, while there is some logic to holding MHPs accountable for
failure to act when a patient has made a credible threat, there is no standard for
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determining such a threat is credible. It is vital that future research continue to push the
idea that there is no established standard of care in duty to warn situations. In fact, as
discussed earlier in this section, if anything duty to warn has led to a deviation from the
typical standard of care high-risk individuals may receive from mental health
professionals.
Special Relationships and Outcome.
Despite special relationships being a staple part of duty to warn literature and
research, this issue was only raised in 35% of the sample. The cases were split in half as
to whether judges determined there was a special relationship between the MHP and the
person who committed the violent act. In the three cases that determined there was a
special relationship (i.e., Dawe, Sherer, & Volk), this hinged on the Tarasoff established
precedent that MHPs have special relationships with their clients that make them liable to
third parties for the actions of those clients. There were two reasons judges denied the
existence of a special relationship between the litigating MHP and their client in the other
three cases. In King v. Smith, this was due to the contact between MHP and client being
seen as too minimal to establish a special relationship. Regarding Tedrick and Kehler,
judges in both cases decided that special relationships require a degree of control that did
not exist because the patient was not in the MHPs custody. Thus, some courts appear to
support the idea that special relationships do not apply in outpatient settings, while others
continue to misapply the special relationship standard to outpatient mental health.
Tarasoff is not just a staple of psychologists’ ethics training, but also a regularly
discussed case in Tort law classes because it creates such an a-typical exception to
American law (Edwards, 2014). As discussed in Bersoff (2014), special relationships in
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mental health were originally meant to exists only when, “A operates a private sanitarium
for the insane. Through the negligence of the guards employed by A, B, a homicidal
maniac, is permitted to escape. B attacks and causes harm to C. A is subject to liability
to C.” However, since the original Tarasoff ruling, this standard has also been applied to
outpatient mental health settings.
Strengths
This study contained many strengths. While cases reviewed in this sample are
discussed in detail in duty to warn literature, the trends expressed within that literature
had not previously been tested. Simply, no one else has empirically reviewed the issues
discussed in duty to warn cases using qualitative analysis. This project provides initial
support for many of the issues legal and psychological scholars have suggested may be
central to decisions in duty to warn cases. For example, there is ample discussion
regarding the issue of foreseeability overriding the typical expectation that no duty exists
outside of when an explicit threat is made against a reasonably identifiable victim. This
is supported by findings from this project, that indicate foreseeability was commonly
used to find MHPs liable despite duty to warn parameters that should have protected
them.
One important finding from this study was the role of negligence in determining
an MHP potentially owed a duty to the injured third party. While duty to warn literature
talks around the idea of negligence (e.g., performing a formal risk assessment should
protect from negligence), the lack of explicit discussion about how commonly this issue
arises is concerning. Moreover, these kind of assertions regarding performing formal risk
assessments fail to take into account how these assessments have not been validated in
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many settings, and how they are not necessarily appropriate for making duty to warn
decisions (Adi & Mathbout, 2018; Kivisto, 2016). Specifically, formalized risk
assessments are not meant to determine if someone presents an immediate threat to the
person they are expressing homicidal ideation toward. Rather, an understanding of the
static and dynamic risk factors that influence the likelihood of violence (Kivisto, 2016),
as well as knowing the steps for a thorough (if informal) risk assessment like that
proposed by Borum and Reddy (2001), are vital aspects of appropriately assessing risk in
DTW situations. Thus, it is necessary that future literature continue to establish what
exactly is the standard of care in duty to warn situations. Further, these methods must
become a standard part of training for social workers, counselors, therapists,
psychologists and all other types of mental health professionals—as we are all subject to
duty to warn litigation.
Another strength of this project is the variety of research questions it produced.
Some of these trends appear to hold across jurisdictions, but what about within a specific
jurisdiction? Why do courts and legislative bodies continue to support the idea that
warning is effective when there is no empirical support for this claim? Now that we have
a sample of data from outpatient mental health duty to warn cases, do the same trends
exist in inpatient duty to warn cases? How can MHPs utilize expert witness testimony to
effectively prove they met standards of care or otherwise acted non-negligently? Would a
wider sample of cases lead to an increase in discussion about ambiguous language in duty
to warn statutes (as this is such a significant part of the DTW literature)? Similarly,
would a larger sample have resulted in more examples of statute reinterpretation? These
are only a few of the questions raised by the results of this project.
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Limitations
There were several limitations with this study. The first being the small sample
size. While the inclusion criteria (i.e., 1. Established duty to warn law, 2. Case occurred
after law was enacted, 3. Case involves outpatient therapists/clinics only) was purposeful
and theory driven, it lead to a substantial decrease in the expected sample. The hope was
to be able to discuss trends that occur within and across jurisdictional lines rather than
focus on one state in particular. Because the 17 cases represented rulings across 12 states,
it is difficult to determine what is a trend versus an anomaly. If this author had known
ahead of time that the resulting sample would be so small, a different methodology would
have been applied. Specifically, this author may have chosen two states and reviewed all
of the duty to warn cases available and compared trends within and across just those two
jurisdictions. Finally, while inductive content analysis allows for cautious inferences to
be made, those inferences are from a very small subsample of duty to warn cases. It is
important that any future research using this coding scheme be conducted using a larger
sample size to allow for statistical analysis to confirm or reject the observable patterns
found in this study.
Regarding study design, this research project was also limited due to the small
number of raters. Other than the subsample of cases recoded by the interrater, open
coding, coding scheme development and the final coding process were conducted by one
person, this author. Typically, the coding process is completed by multiple raters to
ensure that the coding scheme is unbiased. However, this being a dissertation and not a
funded research project, the opportunity to recruit multiple coders was small.
Unfortunately, while there was strong percentage agreement observed when comparing
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the three cases recoded for interrater reliability (PAo = .92), Holsti’s method resulted in
poor overall interrater agreement (PAo = .27). While this appears to be due to using too
small of a sample of recoded cases, it does represented a problem for pursuing
publication and must be adjusted. Any future research must be conducted with more than
two coders and included a greater number of cases coded for interrater reliability.
Other limitations to this study were related to this authors’ background and
training in forensic psychology rather than law. For example, this author lacked
understanding about some basic facts regarding legal decision making. Specifically, this
author did not previously understand how judges were limited to responding to issues
raised within motions or petitions submitted by the attorneys. Upon the initiation of this
project, this author was under the impression that judges were picking the issues
discussed within these cases, not that they were responding. Increased legal knowledge
may have influenced this author to adjust the research question to capture the issues
attorneys are raising within duty to warn cases and how judges respond to them, which
may have led to a different coding scheme.
Further, someone with legal training may have determined different explanations
for the specific rulings. For example, this author was able to extrapolate that the Tedrick
decision relied on arguments related to voluntary undertaking and transferred negligence,
but would still struggle to describe the legal decision making behind establishing these
two findings. Someone with a stronger background in legal studies may have been able
to make more specific determinations. In future projects, it may be important to
collaborate closely with a legal researcher in order to address this limitation. Further, this
could allow any findings be made more applicable to legal studies or legislative decision
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making as well as psychological studies. Overall, however, because this was a project
meant to increase psychologists understanding of duty to warn cases, not to detail the
legal arguments used to make those decisions, this was not a major limitation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this project uncovered several common themes that appear to
directly influence the outcome of duty to warn cases. Statute interpretation, negligence,
foreseeability, duty to third parties, standard of care, and special relationships appeared to
have the strongest effect on the outcome of the cases. However, this does not discount
the importance of issues related to ambiguity, confidentiality, control, expert witness
testimony, identifiability, medical malpractice, and risk prediction. Future research with
a larger case sample may led to these themes carrying different weights, especially if the
sample is large enough to apply quantitative methods to the analysis. These findings
provide important information for practicing mental health professionals, as the
prominence of negligence findings encourage MHPs to develop a deeper understanding
of the factors surrounding potential dangerousness. Unfortunately, it also highlights how
from the perspective of a psychologist, many of these findings of negligence do not make
sense as they rely on a nonspecific standard of care. Simply referring to what a
reasonable mental health professional in the same or similar situation would have done
does not appropriately capture the standard of care in mental health, because there is such
a wide variety of mental health professionals and standards. It is important that future
researchers seek to establish clearer guidelines for MHPs for responding to DTW
situations. Further, additional research using this coding scheme can help elucidate the
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divide between what MHPs think is expected of them, and how superior courts may view
the situation.
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